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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis describes the decision-making processes for company grade officers 
operating in combat roles in Iraq and seeks to determine if innovation largely originates 
among lower ranking officers. It analyzes the incentives structure and the command 
climate of the U.S. Army in Iraq and how officers operate within this environment. 
Interviews with officers who served in Iraq illuminate motivations for innovation. The 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  PURPOSE 
 The United States Military faces a critical mission in Iraq. It is fighting a guerilla-
style counterinsurgency, a type of conflict that has proven difficult to execute for most 
modern militaries. The United States experienced strategic and military failure in 
Vietnam in part due to the inability of its military institutions to adapt their organizational 
structures and to implement doctrine to conduct counterinsurgency operations.1 History is 
repeating itself in Iraq, and we are once again seeing the “failure” of the United States 
Army to adapt to the non-conventional operational environment. 
 One explanation for this failure to adapt to a counterinsurgency environment lies 
in the nature of bureaucratic, hierarchical organizations that are resistant to change.  
Anecdotal evidence in Iraq suggests that the U.S. military was wholly unprepared for the 
operational environment it encountered after the invasion and occupation in 2003. The 
military waited a full three years to adopt a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy 
after the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld resigned and General David H. Petraeus, who 
coauthored the new counterinsurgency manual FM 3-24, was put in charge of coalition 
forces in Iraq in 2006. Most of the explanations for the lack of a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency strategy focus on the failure of senior officers and officials to develop 
institutions capable of fighting in this kind of combat environment. 
 This thesis explains this phenomenon by analyzing the dichotomy between the 
decision-making process of senior officers and small unit commanders and how these 
differences affect the daily operations of the soldier on the ground. It describes the 
operational environment of company grade officers serving in combat leadership roles in 
Iraq. This thesis offers the proposition that an institutional decision-making framework, 
known as the “the rules of the game,” drives the decision-making process of battlefield 
commanders at the company level. This institutional framework corrupts feedback loops 
                                                 
1 As argued in John Nagl, How to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2002) and John Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990). 
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between the lowest levels of organizational command and the institutional leadership and 
effectively prevents the process of organically-driven change and innovation in the Army. 
 Change is occurring in Iraq after many years of setbacks. General David Petraeus 
was brought in to enact a top down change in the how the Army is fighting in Iraq. 
Currently the Army is now in the process of conducting more effective counterinsurgency 
operations and seeing results. These results can be seen in the decrease in the number of 
attacks after the surge and the decrease in attacks against U.S. Military forces in the 
Anbar province. There is still an inherent flaw within the system, however, that does not 
fully utilize feedback loops to gather useful information from those operating on the 
ground in Iraq.  
The Army professes that it wants internal innovation and change much like a 
modern day successful business, but these changes that have been discussed by some 
within the Army since Vietnam have yet to be fully implemented.2 Internally, important 
issues seem as if they are hardly addressed before outside political pressures demand 
these changes. These are reinforced by the fact that today change appears to only occur 
when the voters in the United States say enough is enough and demand an end to the war 
in Iraq. Only when this occurred did the powers that be finally react and change their 
strategy as evidenced by the resignation of Rumsfeld and the promotion of General 
Petraeus to be in charge of coalition forces in Iraq. 
B.  IMPORTANCE 
 Senior U.S. military officers seem to be especially challenged when it comes to 
translating information from troops on the ground with existing doctrine into effective 
operations on the battlefield in Iraq. All combat operations require superior situational 
awareness to promote a decision-making process that supports successful tactical 
operations. Low intensity conflicts, however, require particularly good situational 
awareness and thoughtful analysis by all leaders. This allows them to arrive at the right 
balance between kinetic and non-kinetic operations against the adversary. Given this 
                                                 
2 Steven M. Jones, “Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic 
Imperative,” Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy (September 2003), 12. 
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situation, it is imperative to explore the strengths and weakness of the current 
communications between small unit commanders on the ground and their senior 
commanders. If good information is not being conveyed in both directions, a 
determination must be made about where and why this breakdown in communication is 
occurring so changes can be made to enhance the situational awareness of all levels of 
command. 
 The U.S. Army has recognized these problems and has slowly been working to 
change this situation. Mechanisms like 360 degree evaluations are being implemented but 
still do not have any official bearing on an officer’s career. Therefore, these reforms 
within the Army are ineffectual and the major system changing proposals have all but 
been ignored. Many observers have suggested that the Army will suffer dire 
consequences if these reforms are not enacted.3 By looking at how company grade 
officers perceive their situations in Iraq, this thesis uncovers a framework beyond the 
official structure of the Army that describes how officers truly make decisions and 
whether or not feedback on how to fight the Iraq war, or counterinsurgencies in general, 
is circulating effectively within the U.S. Army.  
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This thesis relies on information gathered from interviews with officers who 
served in Iraq from the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom to midway through 2006 at 
the latest. The thesis frames data from the interviews in the context of bureaucratic 
organizational decision-making theory. It describes how the Army operated in past 
conflicts and what it is currently trying to do to make itself modern in terms of decision-
making, organization and operations. The information from the interviews will be 
analyzed from a decision-making theory perspective to describe how the military is 
making decisions. In conjunction, the interviews will also be analyzed to see how well 
the Army is meeting its own transformational goals.  
                                                 
3 Steven M. Jones, “Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic 
Imperative,” Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy (September 2003), 29. 
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1.  Survey of Prior Work on Bureaucratic Decision-Making 
 To understand the outputs of bureaucracy, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow 
present three models that describe the decision-making process within bureaucracies. 
Allison and Zelikow suggest that there is more than just a Rational Actor Model (Model 
I—i.e., bureaucracies will act unified and rationally on behalf of the state) when it comes 
to explaining organizational behavior. They expand their description by creating a second 
model known as the Organizational Behavior Model (Model II). Model II states that 
decision-making processes reflect the influence of standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
within organizations. When senior officers or policymakers seek a response to the outside 
world, they are in effect choosing among SOPs or combination of SOPs to answer these 
problems. The military, like other traditional bureaucracies, follows many SOPs; so as a 
result, tracking the influences of SOPs on decision-making in Iraq becomes an important 
factor in this study.  
 Allison and Zelikow offer a third model to illustrate how individual groups within 
an organization act rationally on their own behalf to achieve their own goals and to 
bargain with other organizations over the division of responsibility in terms of achieving 
national objectives. This last model is known as the Government Politics Model (Model 
III).4 In the Army this means that leaders would be acting rationally on their own behalf 
instead of trying to win the war. There is also a dichotomy of beliefs in how to fight 
between the various ranks within the Army, which can be indicative of Model III. This is 
because of the constant struggle between the various levels of the Army organization in 
trying to accomplish their mission as they perceive it. 
The role higher ranking leaders play in the bureaucratic decision-making on the 
conduct of the war in Iraq can be seen through the difference in objectives embraced by 
senior and junior leaders. While it can be argued that everyone wants “to win the war,” 
senior and junior leaders find themselves in vastly different environments. Junior officers 
face the rigors of combat and are faced with immediate life and death decisions that can 
have a direct impact on the soldiers under their command.  They also have the daily 
                                                 
4 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
(Menlow Park, CA: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc, 1999).  
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interaction with the people and the ever changing environment that heavily influences 
their decision-making processes in these times. Senior officers have a broader perspective 
and must monitor the overall health of their organization, laying the groundwork not only 
for success in the current conflict, but preparing to fight the next war.  It is not surprising, 
that these different and sometimes competing decision-making priorities create a gap in 
perception that can affect operational performance in the actual combat operations.  
 Allison and Morton Halperin further break down the process of decision-making 
in bureaucracies suggested in Model III, stating that the decision-making process is 
affected by the process of gamesmanship and the “pulling and hauling” between 
organizational components.5 This goes against commonly accepted views that 
organizations always operate in favor of the larger group instead of individual actors 
acting in their own self interest. Allison and Halperin point to this behavior as not 
necessarily being irrational on the individual level, while it may seem that way when 
viewed as a combined output of an organization. 
 Jerel Rosati augments the bureaucratic paradigm by suggesting that “…three 
decision-making structures…are possible depending upon the degree of participants’ 
involvement” in a specific decision.6 One level of involvement is the Presidential level, 
whereby, the executive decision-maker is highly involved, most likely because it is an 
important issue, and they can in fact make themselves omnipotent in the decision-making 
process. The next level is “Bureaucratic Dominance,” which has low presidential 
involvement but greater involvement on the part of the individual and the organization. 
The last level is local dominance, whereby the President and the organization all have 
low involvement and only a small number of individuals are likely to have any interest, 
so therefore the bureaucratic politics model does not apply.7 This explains why there is 
sometimes great variance in outcomes depending on the level of involvement and 
concern shown by leaders.  
                                                 
5 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin. “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications” World Politics Vol. 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations (Spring 
1972): 43. 
6 Jerel A. Rosati. “Developing a Systemic Decision-making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in 
Perspective” World Politics Vol. 33, No. 2. (January 1981): 251. 
7 Ibid., 246-247. 
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 In contradiction to the supporters of Model III, Robert Art views the Rational 
Actor Model as including factors such as domestic politics and generational mindsets. He 
pokes holes in the idea of using the “…bureaucratic paradigm as an approach for 
analyzing American foreign policy [because]…first, it undervalues the influence (or 
weight) of both generational mind-sets and domestic politics on the manner in which top 
decision-makers approach foreign policy; second, it is too sloppy, vague, and imprecise 
as presently constituted to make it worthwhile.”8 Although Art recognizes that these 
factors influence the decision-making process, he acknowledges his critique offers little 
as an alternative to understanding bureaucratic decision-making. This can be seen in the 
difference in mind sets between senior officers that have been conditioned on a Cold War 
mentality and the junior ones that have mainly been exposed to the ideas of terrorism. 
 Supporters of the Rational Actor Model (Model I), such as David Welch, contend 
that “…there are convincing reasons to believe that neither Model II nor Model III is as 
useful as, let alone analytically superior to, Model I.”9 He points out that the system 
supplied by Model II does not affect the rational decision-making process at the point of 
the decision but rather affects its final output.10 Therefore, the rational actor model has 
the most influence on the decision-making process as a whole and therefore its outcome. 
Welch believes that at the point of the final decision, there is no need for Model II or 
Model III. He fails to state why rational decisions made by actors within an organization 
are supposed to guarantee a rational decision made by the organization as a whole. 
 In further support of Model I Thomas Hammond modifies the theories of 
individual decision-making. He suggests that in the discussion of Models II and III, there 
is not enough said about hierarchy and that the similarities between bureaucratic 
organizations and legislative bodies need to seriously be taken into consideration. 
Hammond argues that hierarchy plays a tremendous role in bureaucratic decision-making 
                                                 
8 Robert J. Art. “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique” Policy Sciences 4 
(1973): 487. 
9 David A. Welch. “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and 
Prospect” International Security Vol. 17, No. 2. (Autumn 1992): 114. 
10 Ibid., 117. 
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rather than just horizontal bargaining.11 By pointing this out, he suggests that there is 
always someone at the top making the final decision and the presence of this so-called 
“rational actor” is demonstrating that Model I adequately describes the process in which 
the final decision is made. 
 Daniel Drezner attempts to fill a gap in the framework set forth by Allison and 
Zelikow by contesting that these models do little “…to examine the causal mechanisms 
through which ideas are converted into policies.”12 He does this by discussing how 
missionary institutions, or an institution based on a belief that they want to perpetuate 
within an existing bureaucracy, differently survive or thrive based on how they are 
integrated into the overall larger bureaucratic organization. If an organization is insulated 
it will be more likely to survive, but it will not be in the position to affect policy. If it is 
embedded, it will have less of a chance of survival but will be more likely to have a 
greater impact on current events. 
 By looking at decision-making at the battalion level operations in Iraq, the tenets 
of Model III will be further fleshed out. By determining leaders’ abilities for innovation 
and passing recommendations up the chain of command Drezner’s notion of missionary 
institutions will be measured for accuracy. Since the military is a good example of a SOP 
driven organization, this thesis should be able to determine if Model II has any bearing on 
the decision-making process within Iraq today. If it is shown that feedback does not 
really affect the organization systemically at all, then a hard look will be given to Model I 
and how change is truly enacted to reform an organization. 
2.  Survey of U.S. Military Decision-Making in Low Intensity Conflicts 
 When looking at the decision-making process in low intensity conflict, it is 
important to look at Vietnam where the U.S. Military faced problems similar to those that 
might be encountered in Iraq. John Nagl, in his book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 
compares the adaptability and learning capabilities of the British Army in Malaya from 
                                                 
11 Thomas H. Hammond. “Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics” 
American Journal of Political Science Vol. 30, No. 2. (May 1986): 380-382. 
12 Daniel W. Drezner. “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy” American 
Journal of Political Science Vol. 44, No. 4. (October 2000): 746. 
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1948 to 1957 to those of the U.S. Army in Vietnam from 1950 to 1972. In it he argues 
that the British Army was able to:  
 
encourage its junior officers to seek out organizational performance gaps 
and alternative organizational paths of action, hammer out a consensus on 
the effectiveness of the new doctrines, publish the changes in doctrine, 
train the organization in the new doctrine and enforce its application to 
ensure change in organizational behavior, and observe the effectiveness of 
the new doctrine out in the field.13 
 
While the British were able to change and adapt, the U.S. Army in Vietnam was 
unwilling and unable due to inflexibility of the Army as an institution.14 
 Nagl’s own assessment falls in line with the earlier work of Andrew 
Krepinevich’s, who noted that the U.S. Army was erecting barriers to avoid fighting 
another Vietnam War  
 
…[and] the result has been that instead of gaining a better understanding 
of how to wage counterinsurgency warfare within the unique social, 
economic, political, and military dimensions comprising that form of 
conflict, the Army is trying to transform it into something it can handle.15  
 
Krepinevich’s research on Vietnam found the Army to be a change-resistant organization 
that could not adapt to the requirement that it fight a counterinsurgency. The Army 
restructured itself after Vietnam in some major ways. This included implementing an all 
volunteer force system and training that is subject to extensive after action reviews 
(AARs) of all involved. However, these actions and policies still focused primarily on 
high intensity conflict and the mindset still remained that the best way to fight a 
counterinsurgency was to not involve the United States Army in a counterinsurgency. In 
                                                 
13 John A. Nagl. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
191-192. 
14 Ibid., 205. 
15 Andrew F. Krepinevich. The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1990). 274-275. 
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this particular area the Army has not prepared or restructured itself for future low 
intensity conflict situations. Therefore the two assessments lead one to believe that the 
U.S. Army is not only unwilling and unable to change but that it has a hard time changing 
because counterinsurgency does not fit into the traditional high intensity war fighting 
paradigm. 
3.  Survey of U.S Military Decision-Making in Modern Army 
 The Army conducted a variety of studies on “command climate” that date from 
the 1970s to the present. This literature surveys what exactly the Army as an organization 
has identified as its own problems and what the Army has proposed as solutions. Much of 
this information is summed up in a report for the U.S. Army done by Steven Jones.16 
Jones points out that the survey results conducted in the last 30 years support the 
conclusion that the U.S. Army is an extremely hierarchical and rigid structure. As a 
result, he posits that unless the structure changes and adapts to become more network 
based with information and feedback flowing freely from all levels to all levels, the Army 
will continue to lose its best and brightest junior officers. Jones believes that the 
phenomenon reinforces the problem of hierarchical rigidity within the Army. 
 This study is important because in the middle of these changes being enacted the 
war on terror began followed closely by the war in Iraq, which has led to a delay in 
implementation of these structural changes. The major reforms that it suggests for the 
Army to become a self correcting and networked organization have largely not been 
enacted. The Army today freely shares most of its tactical lessons through all levels of 
leadership. It does this through such things as after action reviews (AARs), the Center for 
Army Lessons Learned (CALL), as well as various Army branch specific journals. So 
while information is shared there is no guarantee that anyone has to learn anything. This 
is reinforced by the fact that there is no official way for those on the bottom of the chain 
of command, the ones who are on the frontlines, to effectively rate and therefore hold 
accountable the decision-makers above them. While there are currently 360 degree 
                                                 
16 Steven M. Jones, “Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic 
Imperative,” Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy (September 2003). 
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evaluation programs, the results are not put on a leader’s record or shared with anyone 
other than the leader being evaluated. 
D.  METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
 This thesis uses the case study method to examine how information gathered from 
the field is used to plan future operations. By using evidence gathered from interviews of 
small unit commanders of the company grade rank who have just served or are still 
serving in combat operations in Iraq, this thesis determines which decision-making 
model, or combination thereof, applies best. Interview questions were geared towards 
determining what small unit commanders believed their superiors wanted them to do. 
Then it was seen how they in turn enacted those decisions while at the same time 
applying their own innovations to complete their missions as safely and efficiently as 
possible. 
 By analyzing Army battalion organizations and operations in Iraq in terms of 
Government Politics Model or Model III, the thesis will show that decisions are not 
necessarily made by rational actors but rather by competing organizations that are in fact 
furthering their own individual causes to the detriment of individual units in the field. 
Interviewees were questioned regarding SOPs, and how they influenced their decision-
making process in an effort to determine if Model II has a bearing on the decision-
making process. This thesis will highlight the strengths of Hammond’s support of Model 
I that states that everyone is acting on behalf of what their superiors want them to do. 
However, there is one very important caveat and that is subordinates actually do what 
they perceive their superiors want done. This situation is currently what the structure of 
Army’s hierarchy encourages and therefore is the most predominant factor in determining 
the outputs of the Army in Iraq. 
 There are two levels of company grade officers, hereafter referred to as 
“Company Men,” that will be described in detail in this paper. Both of them will be in 
combat military occupational specialties (MOS) or served in similar roles in Iraq. The 
one requirement will be that they are officers in charge of combat soldiers on the ground 
in Iraq operating out in sector on a regular basis directly in harm’s way. The first of these 
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two will be the platoon leader, who is usually a brand new officer in the Army. He is the 
lowest ranking officer in a soldier’s chain of command and is directly in charge of the 
soldiers operating in the field. The next is that of the company commander, who is in 
charge of the platoons but still for a large part has a lot of interaction out with the local 
population. 
 Thirty one interviews with Company Men were conducted for this research.17 
From these interviews stories and examples from operations in Iraq will be examined to 
determine trends in styles of leadership. The trends in leadership styles that are consistent 
throughout the interviews will be highlighted. Also, many of the individual experiences 
in Iraq will be taken on a case by case basis to determine the impact of the Army’s 
organizational structure on any individual innovation and adaptation exercised by the unit 
commander to accomplish the mission. These individual experiences will be used as well 
to demonstrate how feedback loops did or did not work. 
                                                 
17 Thirty one (31) separate interviews were conducted and these will be combined with my own 
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II. THE COMPANY MAN 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 As the Iraq war continues, the majority of the operations are being conducted by 
platoon and company-sized units. These elements are led by Company Men. These young 
officers serve in a crucial role. Organizational success depends on their leadership 
abilities and in providing these young officers with sufficient flexibility to adapt tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as dictated by the operational environment. These 
leaders must have access to good information to support their decision-making process 
and should ideally work in an organization that encourages feedback to flow freely not 
only to their peers but up to higher commanders. Movement towards a more adaptive and 
learning organization with minimal barriers to effective communication has been the goal 
of the Army. This has been a precedent set by the U.S. Army in comparison to all other 
militaries in the world.18 In Iraq, however, there are inherent flaws that still remain in the 
system as will be shown in this paper. How do these officers address the competing 
requirements to maneuver through their daily lives in Iraq in order to accomplish their 
mission, satisfy the organizational requirements, further their careers and take care of 
their men? 
 The platoon leader is the lowest ranking of these Company Men and often times is 
the most inexperienced of all the officers and in most cases is less experienced than the 
soldiers in the unit. He, therefore, has to not only please his bosses by showing his 
competence but also has to accommodate the needs and desires of his soldiers in order to 
please his boss. The platoon leader needs support from his subordinates because he does 
not have the experience or knowledge to accomplish any mission without their help. The 
company commander, on the other hand, is already one level removed from the men and  
                                                 
18 Steven M. Jones, “Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic 
Imperative,” Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy (September 2003), 17. 
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has at least five years of experience in the Army. This gives the company commander an 
edge over the platoon leader because he can use the platoon leaders as the first buffer of 
information from below while at the same time using them to make his company and its 
mission match expectations coming from his own commanders.  
B.  THE PLATOON LEADER 
 The platoon leader serves in an extremely dynamic position. Many officers 
describe this position as their best time in the Army even though this is when they are 
lowest in the hierarchy of officers. The role that this particular officer holds is the 
officers’ ambassador to the men and conversely the men’s ambassador to the decision-
makers. Therefore this is a difficult position that requires a successful platoon leader to 
learn the desires of both their men and their bosses and implement enough from both 
sides to please them at the same time or lose their job. 
 Most platoon leaders come to the unit as second lieutenants (2LT) straight out of 
their officer basic courses. In some cases the platoon leader positions are not immediately 
available and these individuals serve in various assistant staff positions acting as little 
more than a personal assistant for whomever they are assigned. Once in the platoon 
leader position they are immediately subject to all the pressures of being in a position of 
leadership. In many cases are expected to maintain at least the same level of effectiveness 
in their platoon that their predecessors left it in. They have to accomplish this without the 
benefit of their predecessor’s experience.  
 Speaking strictly in terms of their careers platoon leaders are only rated by and 
immediately responsible to two levels above them; their company commanders and their 
battalion commanders. If they are viewed as incompetent, insubordinate or incapable of 
learning then they are rated poorly and/or in many cases moved out of their positions 
entirely. Usually the platoon leader’s success as a leader depends on the competence of 





sergeant takes great pride in seeing the success of the platoon leader as it reflects not only 
on his career but also the platoon leader’s decisions could directly affect the lives of the 
men that he is put in charge of.19  
 While the platoon leader is at the whim of his commanders he cannot even begin 
to achieve success with his very limited understanding of the operations of the unit and 
experience in general. Therefore on one hand, the platoon leader is reliant upon his 
subordinates for success in execution of missions. On the other hand platoon leaders are 
reliant upon their commanders for documentation of success via positive evaluations. The 
platoon leader is therefore required to respect the wishes and wellbeing of the his 
subordinates while balancing the need to meet the measures of success set forth by his 
commanders, with only the rating by his superiors affecting his long term career success. 
This creates a challenging dynamic. 
 The new platoon leader is in such a dynamic and turbulent period in his career 
that even if he perceives the actions pursued by his commanders in a mission are wrong, 
he has very little basis, either experience or training, on which to stand and voice his 
opinion. The most open of his superiors may give recognition to his concerns but the fact 
of the matter is that when his commanders tell him to do something he, by and large, has 
to do it. Rationally his only options are to do what he is told to do or risk losing his job. 
 The young platoon leader’s most influential source at this time is the company 
commander. This is because the company commander is his primary rater even though 
the senior rater, the battalion commander, is the most important rater. It is the company 
commander who is the platoon leader’s advocate to the battalion commander because he 
is the one who deals with the young platoon leader on a daily basis. This is all contingent 
on whether or not the battalion commander has made platoon leader development a 
priority for the organization. 
 The platoon leader’s more experienced peers, the other platoon leaders in the 
company, will also have a large influence on the platoon leader because they know what 
the commander wants and will either help the young platoon leader achieve success or if 
                                                 
19 Based on the differences between the OER and NCOER systems, NCOs are typically rated on more 
quantifiable information than the OER system (ie. PT scores, Weapons Qualification, Soldiers promoted, 
etc…) 
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it is within a very competitive environment, will from time to time set him up for failure. 
Either way, the young platoon leader is rationally using whatever he can, whether it is the 
support of his peers, his men, or his own wits just to impress upon the commanders that 
he is a good leader so that he is not only positively rated but allowed to keep leading his 
men. This is reinforced by the current evaluation system in which time in leadership 
positions is the only variable that is accessible and pertinent to outside review at the next 
stage of evaluation.20 
 Because the platoon leader is inexperienced and vulnerable in terms of his career, 
he is subject to the will of his commanders. This means that in most cases the young 
platoon leader, if his commanders so desire, must take responsibility for his actions or 
that of his unit which happened in the field or in combat, even if they were not directly 
related to his decisions. His own personal beliefs must be set aside in order to be in line 
with what is expected of him by his leaders. If the young platoon leader attempts to 
defray responsibility away from himself, especially up the chain of command, this will 
typically be perceived negatively and his superiors will have a host of reasons why the 
blame still rests with the platoon leader. 
 As he gains experience, he should use his increasing authority over the platoon to 
bring its outputs within the desired objectives of his commanders. He is granted more 
freedom of maneuver within the company, especially if he has demonstrated success in 
his company and/or a newer younger platoon leader has come into the company as the 
new junior officer in the company. Usually within three to six months, the successful 
young platoon leader has come to understand the system and has aligned his views with 
his commanders. He essentially knows what the leadership’s top priorities are and what 
actions are deemed inconsequential. He also knows what he can overtly have an influence 
upon in terms of his commanders set priorities and which things to just leave alone or 
affect in a covert manner. 
 Once a platoon leader has served for a year, he has set the tone for himself and if 
left in place to lead a platoon, transitions to being a senior platoon leader. In addition, if 
                                                 
20 Currently all lieutenant OERs are masked so that once a lieutenant becomes a captain his 
evaluations, other than time and place served in a position, are no longer reviewable for future 
considerations.  
 17
the senior platoon leader has served in a combat environment, the senior platoon leader 
has attained a level of influence with the battalion commander on par with a new 
company commander. They still have to deliver what their commanders want to be 
considered successful and if they are in opposition to their leaders’ goals, they will likely 
be removed from their position and put in a less desirable and less beneficial one in terms 
of their careers. So while they have a much better understanding of the situation on the 
ground, they must still operate within the confines of the system dictated by their 
commanders. 
 This situation is not as bad as it first appears because an intelligent senior platoon 
leader should by this time thoroughly understand the ins and outs of his organization and 
should know what causes he can champion. He also has a better grasp on what both his 
superiors and subordinates want. Even if he does make a mistake in overstepping his 
bounds with his leadership or even in a tactical sense, he is given much more leeway 
because of his proven experience. This can be double edged sword though, because he 
could be expected by his leaders not to make silly mistakes because now he has the 
experience to know better. The mistakes he is likely to be able to make without serious 
repercussions are when he takes legitimate tactical risks to accomplish goals set forth by 
the commanders. If a risk is taken and mistakes are made outside of the parameters of 
success set by the commanders this can lead to his removal as a leader.  
 Senior platoon leaders can often times have more clout within the battalion than 
their commanders because of their meaningful experiences, which will include tactical 
successes that have caught the attention of their battalion commanders or the other senior 
officers in the battalion to include the battalion operations officer (S3), battalion 
executive officer and other company commanders. By this time the platoon leader has 
also demonstrated by his success in fulfilling his battalion commander’s goals that he is 
loyal to the unit because he has essentially bought into the command climate. 
 The most important aspects of success for the platoon leader in Iraq are 
demonstrating his loyalty to his chain of command. Either he has bought into what they 
are trying to accomplish, or he has been moved to a less influential position. It is much 
more damaging to his career to simply lose his job than a bad evaluation could ever be. 
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Also, the senior platoon leader is often loyal to his platoon because he has developed 
bonds of loyalty from when he was assisted by his soldiers during his experience as a 
young platoon leader and so he looks out for their welfare. He is not required in any 
direct, short term way to do so to ensure success in his career. 
C.  THE COMPANY COMMANDER 
 The next individual to be discussed is the company commander. He is almost 
always a captain, who has been a platoon leader, has been through more standardized 
Army training in the form of a captain’s career course, and usually has served on staff 
positions within the division. The perception of the new company commander within his 
new battalion is informed by his performance on staff, his reviews as a platoon leader 
(time and places served only), and any personal relationships already developed within 
the battalion.  
 The new company commander is put in a precarious position from the beginning 
because most of the time it has been implied, if not said directly that “command is a 
privilege and not a right.”21 The company commander can easily see that for himself as 
he usually came from a staff position and was himself waiting months for the prior 
company commanders time to draw to an end. He would himself have leapt at the chance 
to take over for a company commander that was deemed less than adequate by the 
battalion commander. 
 The first thing the company commander has to accomplish is to understand his 
higher battalion and brigade commanders’ expectations and desires. This includes 
specifically how his commanders expect him to accomplish his tasks. In terms of Iraq, 
this usually reinforces the offensive mindset, like “taking the fight to the enemy,” as the 
desired attribute for accomplishing goals and missions.22 This mindset is engendered by 
                                                 
21 Anecdotal statements made by a majority of company commanders interviewed and at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
22 A typical phrase used by Commanders to describe their action that is almost always looked on in a 
favorable manner. 
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the command climate and will be discussed in more detail later. However, it is the 
variable that separates maneuver warfare from counterinsurgency operations.23 
 The point that must be emphasized is the offensive mindset, while present in the 
majority of officers operating Iraq, is not what drives the company commander’s 
decisions. What drives him is that he is working at the battalion and brigade 
commanders’ discretions and if he does not “toe the line” with the policy of the field 
grades he will soon find himself without a company command and his career derailed 
because he did not reach the appropriate amount of time required to become branch 
qualified.24 His future options within the Army are extremely limited within the coveted 
maneuver branch of the Army. He therefore adopts the offensive mindset set forth by his 
chain of command, which can be traced all the way to the top where the President George 
Bush repeatedly states that “we will take the fight to the enemy.” 
 For the most part, the battalion and brigade commanders have already weeded out 
any captains that do not agree with the established command climate from the ranks of 
the staff captains. The favorite staff captains are put in combat leadership company 
commands as soon as possible, while the least favorite are held beck for years sometimes 
until they can place him in charge of an innocuous company or a company that is in 
garrison in the states. This way if he does not work out they can remove him and replace 
him with a more conducive personality to the current command climate before they head 
back to a combat environment. 
 After a few months time in his position, his status will be determined. The “bad” 
company commander will be forced out at the year mark and will be extremely 
micromanaged until that time, while the “good” company commanders will of course 
have earned more leeway within the battalion and brigade to conduct operations with a 
little more independence. They also have shown themselves to be a “bad” or “good” 
company commander to their own subordinates but many times the viewpoints between 
                                                 
23 Lt. General David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq, 
Military Review 4 (January-February 2006). 9-10. 
24 The reality is that if he does not reach 18 months in one company command or 24 months in two 
company commands his overall evaluation as a company commander will be looked on unfavorably during 
future reviews regardless of any wording on the evaluation itself. 
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the soldiers and the battalion and brigade leadership are not the same because of the 
divergent desires and expectations of the respective sides.  
 When the company commander is branch qualified, having commanded a 
company for at least a year, it means that he is still on track in terms of his career. 
Everything beyond this point only makes him look better on his officer evaluation report 
(OER). The OER is no longer masked when an officer reaches captain and therefore is 
reviewable for performance and not only positions served. By this time if the company 
commander is keeping his job bets are he has established a relationship with the battalion 
commander. Usually this means he is in line with the battalion commander’s own 
perspective enough so that he is basically considered one of the gang. 
 What is safe to assume by this time is that the innovators who were outside of the 
battalion and brigade commanders’ ways of seeing things have been weeded out. The 
successful company commanders have also made it to this point by showing their deeds 
in actions that can be recorded. This is not only beneficial because actions can be rated 
better than ideas but also because actions make their commanders look like they are 
accomplishing something tangible. 
D.  HOW TO SUCCEED AS A COMPANY MAN 
 Up to this point, a rather bleak picture has been painted of the Company Man’s 
predicament of how to succeed. Most Company Men, however, are not as cold and 
calculating as this system might suggest. When conducting the interviews it was found 
that a majority of leaders in the Army do attempt abide by the leadership principles set 
forth in FM 6-22. That is to say that all of the Army officers interviewed were looking 
out for what they perceived as the long term health of the Army as an organization. It is 
not a requirement to listen to one’s subordinates and even the best leaders can easily turn 
off the spigot when it comes to the information flow from underneath. So being an officer 
that is aware of all the happenings underneath him, and thus “self-aware”, is an endeavor 
that requires constant effort on the part of the officer himself. 
 Reverting back to the unfortunate situation the rational Company Man finds 
himself in, this section will show alternative routes for success and the many different 
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snares that await them along the way that could lead them to failure. He is still in essence 
trying to please only his two raters above himself. If he wants to change their viewpoints 
or if he happens to buy into counterinsurgency types of doctrine while his raters do not; 
there are alternative methods for succeeding. 
 The Company Man has to take risks with his own career in order to accomplish 
tasks he believes are necessary. This of course is measured risk and is usually weighed 
against what an officer believes that he can recover from if he does not achieve the 
desired results. Also, while going outside of accepted norms in accomplishing results is 
often allowed or even encouraged in most command climates, the end result must fit 
squarely with the command climate expectations. 
 Here is where the term “satisficing” comes into play. It is a term that was coined 
by Herbert Simon that means “to accept a choice or judgment as one that is good enough, 
one that satisfies.”25 In the Army it is often applied as doing just enough to make one’s 
boss happy. Essentially, an officer will produce results that are just enough to fall within 
acceptable parameters set forth by their respective commanders.  
 One way for the Company Man to satisfice the command climate is to make his 
superiors look good. If the parameters for success of the commanders are defined by the 
number of enemy dead bodies produced by the Company Man then the Company Man 
could produce other quantifiable metrics that look good on his commanders’ evaluations. 
This would be done especially if the Company Man disagreed with that metric or was 
unable to fulfill them. The Company Man’s superiors may be willing to accept other 
things in lieu of body counts. For instance, delivering caches of weapons as opposed to 
body counts might be a suitable alternative. The key is that in any environment even the 
most idealistic officer has to perform within the parameters of success established by his 
boss and the chain of command. This usually has to be done by means of quantifiable 
tasks because ideas still do not translate well to the current way of doing OERs. 
 In Iraq an officer at any level is usually given quite a bit of leeway in terms of 
acceptable courses of action when the situation has deteriorated greatly. In this light any  
                                                 
25 Arthur S. Reber and  Emily Reber, eds., The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology (London: Penguin 
Books, 1995), s.v. “satisifice.” 
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innovation that brings about an end state that is better than what is currently taking place 
is looked upon favorably. At this point it can be no longer about how many insurgents are 
killed but rather what works. This is because, invariably, just killing the “bad guys” has 
not yielded any results in providing security. In almost all cases like these, the attacks 
have gotten so out of hand that when counterinsurgency measures are finally applied 
there is a very noticeable difference. This is opposed to an area of operations where the 
number of attacks is relatively low so there is not the need to apply counterinsurgency 
measures. In these types of environments counterinsurgency doctrines are more accepted 
because the normal body counts have been accepted as not yielding anything except for 
more dead bodies, often times on both sides. Coincidentally applying counterinsurgency 
tactics and techniques works best against an insurgency and will most often yield the long 
term desired results that are also measurable. 
 One of the most important attributes that a Company Man can have to be 
successful and be allowed to innovate is to be charismatic. Charisma helps the officer 
establish relationships with his higher commanders and build a good rapport. Charisma 
also helps when selling ideas as well; a great idea poorly presented will certainly be lost 
by the wayside, while a poor idea well presented will be sure to enable the company 
grade officer to be in the good graces of his commanders.26 Due to the lack of feedback 
that is allowed in the system, even if the plan comes off poorly it usually has others to 
blame since the higher commander has already bought into the idea. Therefore, the 
execution must have been off somewhere else besides with the senior commander himself 
or the man who created the plan. 
 One of the biggest drawbacks in the restricted feedback system that currently 
exists in the Army is the issue of not receiving anything negative back up the chain of 
command. This is because in many instances if the company grade officer complains 
about something that is not right he is looked down upon. The usual response given to the 
offending officer is that they must have messed up because they have not fixed it 
 
                                                 
26 The interviews, as well as personal experience, showed that those who developed personal 
relationships with their commanders were more likely to have their ideas approved. 
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themselves. In all actuality it is probably much truer that the Company Man’s own 
commander will not address the issues presented in order to not appear to be incompetent 
to those above him. 
E. COMMAND CLIMATE IN IRAQ 
 FM 6-22 describes feedback loops and the need to establish a positive command 
climate. For instance it states that “an open and candid environment is a key ingredient in 
creating a unit that is poised to recognize and adapt to change.”27 FM 6-22 and other 
surveys conducted by the Army point out that multi-sourced leader reviews are essential 
in creating a leader that is self aware. These reviews would require that a leader be not 
only rated by his leaders but also his peers and subordinates. This self awareness and 
understanding not only of the leader’s unit’s capabilities but also the situation on the 
ground help to create a leader who then can relatively quickly adapt to change. This is 
because the leader is truly interested in discovering what his peers and those below him 
think because they will be rating him. 
 In Iraq, however, the command climate is different. The acceptance of feedback 
was solely at the discretion of the commanders. For example, even if the idea was one 
that was agreed upon by all platoon leaders within a company there was no rational basis 
for the company commander to change his course of action. This was because he did 
what he thought was right or because he was trying to please his own bosses, or usually a 






                                                 
27 Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile, Headquarters Department 
of the Army, Washington D.C., June 2001, 8-2, 8-13. 
28 Personal experience in serving as an armor platoon leader as part of 1-13 Armor Battalion based out 
of Taji, Iraq in 2005. In addition it is a generally accepted fact that if permission is required two levels 
above many times the middle man will say no on behalf of his own boss rather than face being told no 
himself. 
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case and there were many open commanders who were willing to listen to their 
subordinates, there were others who just outright ignored them when it came to certain 
ideas.29 
 While many, if not most, command climates were very positive and constantly 
used feedback this paper will look at instances where the feedback loops completely 
broke down. This can often happen in very effective organizations with only one leader 
breaking this chain. Once these loops are broken down positive ideas can have extremely 
negative outputs in terms of exhaustive SOPs. These leave subordinate Company Men 
and soldiers alike feeling micromanaged. This is due to the interpretation and acceptance, 
or not, of these inappropriate SOPs by the Company Man.   
 Command climate was and is especially important in the counterinsurgency in 
Iraq. This is because for the first three years of the conflict there was no specified 
doctrine in fighting counterinsurgency type conflicts. Now that there are new manuals, 
like FM 3-24, the need for information freely flowing from all levels of the organization 
is absolutely imperative. The most important being from the Company Men up to their 
commanders because the Company Men are the officers that deal with the indigenous 
population, as well as their own soldiers, everyday on a daily basis on the ground in Iraq. 
These men are most likely to discover the most effective tactics, techniques and 
procedures through the process of trial and error and the necessity to learn quickly 
because their lives and those of their men depend on it. This same necessity is hardly felt 
higher up in the chain of command and in many instances a dead American soldier is a 
good thing for these commanders because it shows that they are operating in a 
“dangerous” sector. 
 The way that the command climate primarily exists in Iraq today is from the top 
down. This is because rationally the officers have to impress their leaders in this 
hierarchical structure in order to maneuver through and enhance their careers. Therefore 
they are not likely to push an issue if it runs counter to their career success, even 
                                                 
29 Out of the 32 interviews there were at least 10 that directly mentioned and instance like this or being 
in an organization that operated this way. My own personal experience in Iraq had many of my own ideas 
that I and my peers arbitrarily shut down by superiors in three of the five battalions I worked for before I 
could even present them. 
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sometimes at the expense of the welfare of their men. The soldiers are not without 
recourse. With correspondence back home they are often able to voice their major 
concerns to their civilian relatives and friends. This usually then becomes an issue in the 
media and/or catches a politicians’ attentions and is pushed back down the chain of 
command in the form of a command inquiry.30 
 As a democracy, the United States Government is at the end of the day 
responsible to its people. The politicians will then for both noble and self-serving 
purposes jump on board with the support of the troops and demand change. In this 
situation the desires of the political leadership, are then interpreted as they flow down the 
chain of command.31 As Kier provides,” the military’s culture intervenes between 
civilian decisions and military doctrine.”32 
 Take for instance the issue of up armoring the High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). In an article on the lack of HMMWVs in Iraq (Dayton 
Daily News, April 30, 2004) Mei-Ling Hopgood describes how there was at first a 
response to the citizens back home who were hearing that their sons and daughters were 
being blown up and that there were available products, materials or equipment to deter 
these actions. The politicians had to take up the cause of procuring these up-armored 
HMMWVs for the soldiers. The Army, because of its slow manner in synthesizing and 
acting upon information coming up the chain of command, failed to do anything about 
this with any haste; even though requests for additional armored vehicles had repeatedly 
been asked for by commanders operating in Iraq.33 The nation responded with shock 
upon hearing this and thus the Army decided that all soldiers would have up-armored 
HMMWVs. This would be done regardless of their situation and corresponding needs 
and requests. 
  
                                                 
30 A command inquiry is a formal written inquiry from civilian leadership that poses a specific 
grievance of a soldier within that command that the company commander must respond immediately to in 
writing through his/her chain of command. 
31 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 140.  
32 Ibid., 140. 
33 Richard Whittle. “Pentagon Acknowledges Shortage of Armored Humvees.” The Pitt News, 
(December 9, 2004). http://media.www.pittnews.com (accessed February 12, 2008). 
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 This type of environment creates a system where the officers in this command 
climate become risk averse, not with their soldiers’ lives but rather with their own 
careers. Everything is planned so as to avoid blame from above because this is where 
they fear retribution coming from.34 FM 6.0 clearly identifies that responsibility cannot 
be delegated and that “only the commander has total responsibility for what the command 
does or fails to do,” nevertheless a commander can delegate authority for a subordinate 
commander or leader to act within the intent of the higher commander.35 Delegation of 
responsibility is done so that superior officers can avoid punishment by pushing blame 
for failures to the subordinate leaders.   
 All of these are created to prevent repercussions from their own leaders and from 
the American people. Basically a vicious cycle is created that the soldiers, as a group, ask 
for something like up-armored HMMWVs. Their superiors ignore them because their 
recognizing the problem and informing their own commanders is not conducive to their 
own career success. Then the soldiers write home or tell their family upon their arrival 
home that they did not receive up-armored HMMWVs.36 In some instances they even 
skipped their whole chain of command and asked the Secretary of Defense themselves 
which is then of course published by the media.37 There are actually two problems 
occurring here; the most obvious one to the civilians back home is that the soldiers do not 
have up-armored HMMWVs, but the more subtle and dangerous effect to the war effort 
is the fact the men were not listened to by their superiors. 
 Back home the civilians contacted their government representatives who then saw 
both political gain and personal attachment to the welfare of the soldiers, stood on their 
pulpit and demanded that soldiers receive up-armored HMMWVs. It was usually never 
                                                 
34 Personal experience as an armor platoon leader in 1-13Armor Battalion on Taji, Iraq serving under 
3rd Infantry Division in 2005. Nearly every week a new plan was put in place by a different level of 
leadership above myself about how to properly clear weapons. 
35 Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, Headquarters 
Department of the Army, August 2003, 2-1. 
36 This was discovered by personal experience when I questioned the soldiers of the 39th Brigade that 
we replaced on Taji in February 2005. During OIF II they received only the standard HMMWVs with the 
add on armor. They wrote back home so that they could have steel plates and Kevlar pads sent to them so 
they could reinforce the HMMWVs that they had which lacked floor armor. 
37 George Edmonson. “Humvee Makers Dispute Rumsfeld Remarks,” Cox News Service, December 
10, (2004), http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/203200_armor10.html (accessed February 11, 2008). 
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mentioned that the soldiers also needed to have an effective information loop where their 
suggestions can go up the chain of command as well as orders being give from above 
down the chain of command. Additionally, there was no recognition that these types of 
problems would be more efficiently solved going up the chain of command and not 
around it. 
 As a result, the Pentagon then hears about these problems and they work their 
way back down. The question then is why did this information not come up organically 
through the proper feedback loops within the Army? This answer has a large part to do 
with the rating system again. Officers have to impress their bosses, if they are 
complaining about something and do not have a good solution for it themselves, then 
they are looked upon unfavorably. The officer then walks a fine line usually pacifying his 
own subordinates by either directly saying, or soldiers know it by implication anyway, 
that their own superiors would not listen to them, so there is nothing that could be done 
about the situation. 
 The counterintuitive part about the whole process is that the leaders within the 
organization would be better off if they were accountable to their subordinates. Take for 
instance the issue of negligent discharges. Having any soldier die an accidental death is a 
horrible thing, not just morally but career wise. That officer’s commanders will then look 
at that officer and ask him what he did wrong. This is only because their own 
commanders are doing the same thing with them. If the officer’s ratings were based on 
his men then the issue would be quickly resolved. 
 This would be because if the soldier who fired the negligent discharge was an 
idiot and problem soldier anyway, the men would then collaborate this fact. Whereas if 
the commander was to blame for running the soldiers ragged to where they were tired or 
rushed everywhere they were going then it would fall on the commander. If the problem 
was higher in the chain of command then the Company Man’s peers would corroborate 
this in their reviews of their mutual commander. This would be because the commanders 
would be concerned just as much about what his men think about him as what his 
superiors think.  
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 The problem then is what is actually happening inside of this command climate 
and do the company commanders know about it? This question has to be asked because if 
the officer in charge is not self aware, or self unaware, then it can be a pretty good bet 
that he has no idea what some of the things are that are happening underneath him. For 
instance with the idea of negligent discharges, it became priority information all the way 
up to the brigade and even the division levels in Iraq during OIF III in Baghdad.38 The 
idea was that leaders would be relieved of their positions or severely reprimanded if a 
negligent discharge happened and this fear would ensure that there were no negligent 
discharges. 
 Division level leaders essentially did not trust or believe that they were receiving 
all the information or that it was being handled appropriately. They therefore kept all the 
punishment authority at division level. This then created extreme reactions at the brigade 
and lower levels to accommodate these new requirements. It reinforced the rationality to 
micromanage.39 The climate of zero defects encourages micromanagement out of need 
for mid and high level commanders to protect their careers from the impact of a normal 
accident or mistake underneath them.40 
 There were many options by company grade officers to deal with this scenario 
and not all of them entirely honorable. The first one sought out was to take whatever 
SOPs that were handed down by brigade or division and tighten them down even more. If 
division said that every weapon would be checked by an E-6 or higher then they 
company commander could make it so that every weapon had to be checked by the patrol 
leader, usually the platoon leader, so that if there was a negligent discharge he could 
show that he had set up even extra SOPs and now it was the lieutenant that was 
responsible for the incident. 
 Other options that were adopted by patrols verged on the simple to very scary 
when one places the Army in the context of a combat environment. One of the more 
                                                 
38 Personal experience; this was the case with 3rd Infantry Division during OIF III operating in and 
around Baghdad. 
39 Steven M. Jones, “Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate:  A Strategic 
Imperative,” Strategic Studies Institute, (September 2003) 11. 
40 Allison Graham and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision (Addison-Wesley Educational Publisher, 
1999), 159. 
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effective methods was to not have the soldiers pull their triggers when firing into the 
clearing barrels.41 This way, theoretically if there was a bullet in the gun, it would not go 
off. The idea behind the original SOP was that the weapons would be properly cleared. 
The reality in this situation became that the weapons would not be cleared because the 
punishment was for the bullet coming out of the gun and into the clearing barrel rather 
than a soldier walking around with a bullet still in his weapon. It is obviously infinitely 
more dangerous for a weapon to be loaded and no one to know it than to have it cleared 
into a clearing barrel. This just shows the irrationality of the micromanagement. 
 Other ways of dealing with this scenario was to have the soldiers walk around in 
sector with their weapons unloaded. This was because in all actuality in most sectors 
firefights did not happen every day or even every month. The most important thing that 
soldiers and their leaders had to worry about was IEDs and losing their jobs because of 
accidentally firing a round into the clearing barrel.42 Accidentally firing a round into a 
clearing barrel that was designed exactly for that purpose should probably not be as big 
of a concern as IEDs if the Army is to be an effective fighting organization focused on 
winning. However, because this was the decision that would be made leaders would 
rather take the risk of having their men walk around with empty weapons than losing 
their careers because of a clearing incident.43 
 This is essentially a complete breakdown in the cycle of accomplishing a mission. 
Once the feedback loop is removed from the equation the planning process yields 
unintended results. Now the mission planning cycle is essentially creating cycles within  
                                                 
41 This was a standard operating procedure for the 3rd Infantry Division in and around Baghdad during 
OIF III. 
42 A sentiment widely expressed but explicitly described by CPT Dennis Faulkner who served as an 
infantry company commander in Iraq during OIF III (2005) who had a lieutenant that was relieved from his 
position as a platoon leader because of an accidental discharge at the clearing barrel. My own personal 
experience ratified this incident when I was in Iraq at the same time and the information coming from 
higher command was stating that leaders will lose their jobs if rounds go off in the clearing barrels.  
43 Personal experience as an armor platoon leader in 1-13 Armor Battalion on Taji, Iraq during OIF III 
where I observed other leaders had various levels of weapon ready status and SOPs so as to deter weapons 
discharging into the barrel. In my own platoon it was generally a practice not to charge crew served 
weapons as they had a tendency of going off even when bumped as the safety switches on them would 
often come undone during hours of patrolling. For a M2 .50 caliber flex machine gun there was not a even 
a safety so loading would mean that it would probably accidentally fire during the course of a month of 
patrolling. 
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itself that are removed from the feedback phase. This is what happens when the 
commander becomes self-unaware. Depending on how bad these situations become the 
independent decision-making cycles can spiral more and more out of control with lower 
level leaders creating their informal SOPs and networks to accomplish the task. 
 If the company grade officer does decide to push the responsibility even lower 
than his own current position he will still have to either micromanage everything to 
ensure success or be able, through exhaustively comprehensive SOPs, to lay blame 
further down the chain of command than himself. However, this means that the leaders 
among the enlisted ranks will probably start creating these independent decision-making  
cycles. The Company Man will often times take these independent decision-making 
cycles upon himself so as to prevent them from happening underneath him and without 
his knowledge. 
 It has already been described in the scenario how these decision-making cycles 
create interesting and often times dangerous solutions. Even more sinister they, in the 
long run, start to break down unit cohesion and hierarchy, the very thing they were 
supposedly trying to protect. Once soldiers start seeing their leaders making decisions 
like these they realize that their senior leaders are not advocating for them. If the 
Company Men buy into the senior leadership’s command climate and begin to 
micromanage to achieve these unrealistic goals, then the soldier finds himself in a very 
unfavorable situation because now he knows that no one is advocating for him.  
 The next logical conclusion to follow is that the soldiers take these independent 
decision-making cycles in their own hands. They have much less to lose in terms of 
career because they are already at the bottom of the heap in terms of the Army’s 
hierarchy and do not have as much responsibility. It will naturally follow that they will 
suck it up and drive on if it is just an annoyance to them. If they perceive that it is an 
actual threat, they will seek to derail the careers of officers over them, by “accidentally”  
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firing a negligent discharge for instance.44 In the case of Vietnam these soldiers would 
find themselves without an advocate and without hope and in many cases would dispatch 
of their immediate commanding officers. 
 This scenario is of course the extreme and the soldiers have not, to our current 
knowledge of the war in Iraq, found it necessary to dispatch of their leaders. In a lot of 
cases the self-unaware leader usually finds himself in trouble in other ways. The soldiers 
either let him fail out of malice or more likely because there is no established feedback 
system within that unit to allow this transfer of information. So in the end the self-
unaware officer is brought down by his own established systems. 
F. SUMMARY 
 Being an Army officer is a profession and as such the members of this profession 
abide by codes of conduct and guiding principles. This idealism currently is what drives 
the Army today and has produced many of the outstanding officers that the Army has 
seen in its history. However, in today’s combat environment where casualties have 
dropped and technology has become king new factors have come into play. Officers are 
not required to operate by these principles in order to succeed because their failures are 
no longer revealed by high losses or complete eradication of their units, and therefore the 
problem of poor command climates are not as readily apparent. 
 For information to flow in the Army, the officers have to request to know what 
the problems are underneath them. For this to occur, the officer has to want to know that 
a problem exists. In many cases these ideals and principles provide this desire but in an 
overwhelmingly large number of instances career survival and the need to please their 
own commanders override these decisions. This is further exacerbated if the command 
climate emphasizes that an officer who cannot solve his own problems is lazy and is not 
living up to the ideals of the Army. 
 At the end of the day every officer makes decisions to ensure his survival within 
the Army organization as any other individual operating within a large organization 
                                                 
44 While specific corroboration or evidence of situations such as these cannot be cited anecdotal 
information interviewees and Army soldiers suggest that incidences such as these have occurred.  
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would. If this officer only has to satisfy his two commanders above him then it follows 
rationally that it will be his main objective. Officers can, and often times do, request to 
know what the problems on the ground are but if there is a single break in this transfer of 
information at the command level then everyone below that commander is out of the 
loop. Only by holding leader’s careers at least partially responsible to their subordinates 
will there be any guarantee that solutions that generate from the bottom make it to the 
top. 
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III. EXPERIENCES IN IRAQ 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter is a case study of officers’ experiences in Iraq. While the previous 
chapter cited some particular incidences faced by company men operating in Iraq this 
chapter will go into detail. It will highlight some incidences in Iraq that show just how 
much these officers were able to lead as well as innovate in Iraq. Most of the scenarios 
set forth are from the point of view of the interviewees but may sound familiar because 
similar incidences have been reported in the news or written about elsewhere. 
The interview questions were written in such a way to try and evoke more than 
single sentence responses, especially from email respondents. The interviewees consisted 
of Army and Marine leaders ranging in rank anywhere from sergeant first class (SFC) or 
E-7 to major (MAJ) or O-4. The one requirement is that their job description required 
them to be outside the wire nearly every day conducting operations in a role that had 
them in a leadership position over the group of soldiers that they were leading on the 
ground in Iraq. This would range anywhere from standard combat units to those in charge 
of training Iraqi troops and border control guards. In addition to that, there will also be 
many observations made to how the respondents answered the questions. 
Interviews were conducted with 31 Company Men not including my own 
experiences. A further 24 questionnaires were conducted to try and hammer down some 
hard answers. This is a far cry from the many thousands of interviews and questionnaires 
conducted by the Army in the studies referred to by Stephen Jones in his work but it will 
still help to point out certain trends. Most important will be the stories that are told in the 
interviews and how they describe the current operational climate that existed in Iraq from 
the ground war to the beginning of 2006.  
B.  THE PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING 
Pre-deployment training was important because it showed what the Army had 
institutionalized in terms of training. The majority of emphasis on training going into OIF 
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II and OIF III was that of mid-intensity conflict. Examples of mid-intensity conflict 
included room clearing procedures, quick reaction fire drills and training on crew served 
weapons on HMMWVs. One of the mindsets that pervaded a brigade combat team 
heading Taji, north of Baghdad, was the mindset of fighting another Battle of Fallujah. 
Many leaders and soldiers were expecting ambushes and IEDs everyday and wanted to be 
able to fight back with effectiveness.45  
The responses to the question of whether or not pre-deployment training was 
adequate in preparation for Iraq varied but there were some major trends. When asked if 
the pre-deployment train-up adequately prepare them for going to Iraq there were only 
three strong yes answers (0.093) while the rest were qualified (0.562) or no (0.344). The 
yes respondents were all senior company commanders in Iraq while all, except for one, of 
the no respondents were platoon leaders, FSO’s, or worked training the Iraqi Security 
Forces. There was a pretty even spread between the qualified answers. 
The qualified answers had a consistent theme stating that much of the high 
intensity and mid intensity conflict training was very good. It was agreed upon that the 
cultural training and civil military operations training was severely lacking. There was 
little to no language training at all, what little there was consisted of CIA fact book and 
little book of words written in Iraqi dialect.46 Lastly, there was an extreme focus in a lot 
of units on high intensity urban operations especially in those training for OIF III. 
All this training was of course in preparation for Iraq. The idea was that leaders as 
well as soldiers would have to go through training that was geared towards preparing 
them for the mission they were about to undertake. In the Army a lot of this training was 
mandated from higher under the guidance given by Chief of Staff of the Army General 
Peter Schoomaker. His famous line is that “every soldier is a rifleman first” and as such, 
units began undertaking training that was unusual for their military occupation specialty 
or MOS. In the case of one unit, an armor battalion, the training was to focus much more 
on tasks such as quick reaction fire, room clearing procedures, searching procedures on 
                                                 
45 Personal experience in the 1-13 Armor Battalion 3rd Brigade Combat Team 1st Armor Division 
based out of Fort Riley Kansas preparing in 2004 to deploy to Iraq in 2005 for OIF III.  
46 The CIA fact book was helpful but some facts were a little skewed, like telling the difference 
between the different headscarves in Iraq when it seemed as if the Iraqis just wore whatever color they felt 
like putting on that morning. 
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individuals, traffic control point search procedures, as well as individual weapons 
training and a myriad of other techniques, tasks and procedures more traditionally 
associated with the role of an infantrymen or a military policeman.47 
1. Cultural Training 
The U.S. military soon realized after the initial invasion that they would have to 
do the mission of nation building in Iraq and therefore recognized the need for cultural 
training.48 As such the Army quickly ramped up a program where soldiers would receive 
briefings on what they might encounter while in Iraq. By the end of OIF II and beginning 
of OIF III (2004 and on) it was usually a standard in Army training for soldiers to attend 
battalion sized briefings. These briefings would cover issues such as what and what not to 
do when the soldiers were in Iraq in terms of cultural awareness.  
The briefings suggested many things like pretending the soldiers were married 
and they had kids so that they would be more respected by the people within the Islamic 
and Arab culture in Iraq. The “experts” briefing often suggested placing a picture of a 
random baby boy to put in their wallets so the soldiers could show the Iraqis that they 
“had kids.” This in and of itself was not particularly helpful in my experience in Iraq or in 
anyone else’s experience that was interviewed.49 There were useful tips though, like not 
showing the bottoms of one’s feet or the back of one’s hand that did save the troops some 
unneeded headaches that could have occurred. Overall, the briefings were helpful in some 
situations while in others they focused on trivial things, such as buying a fake wedding 
ring, which would not really help the overall mission and seemed dishonest anyway. 
These briefings were indicative of the lack of a coherent picture and understanding of the 
current situational needs that faced the military members.  
                                                 
47 This was the case with the case of my organic battalion, 1-13 Armor Battalion out of Fort Riley, 
Kansas. Only one company out of three in the battalions was told that they would be only on tanks in Iraq, 
the rest of the companies including my own were to extensively train on these procedures.  
48 “Coaching US Troops on Iraqi Culture.” BBC News. (July 19, 2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/1/hi/world/americas/6904842.stm (accessed February 12, 2008). 
49 In all the interviews that the issue of battalion sized briefings were brought up in it was consensus 
that the telling fictitious things to the Iraqis was best avoided and therefore was not a useful tip. 
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Some respondents indicated that they had little or no cultural training at all before 
deploying to the Middle East. However, there was mandatory training once everyone 
arrived in Kuwait but it was very similar in regards to the briefings soldiers received 
stateside. The experiences were pretty much exactly the same for the leaders who trained 
for OIF III. Basically, it was preparing for another Battle of Fallujah type scenario should 
it arise while the units were in Iraq. While this training was good for its intended 
purposes, the information presented served to offer little in the way of day to day 
operations. One interviewee described this inevitable conundrum of low intensity conflict 
by stating “how do you train to be uncomfortable, hot and tired.”50 
On a positive note, there were even some attempts at cultural training specifically 
aimed at leaders, platoon leader and above, that put them in scenarios at the National 
Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. In these situations leaders had to negotiate with 
an Iraqi-American citizen speaking Arabic through means of an interpreter. 
Coincidentally enough often times the leader was given nothing with which to negotiate 
so as to teach a leader how to bargain when they had nothing to offer. Little did many 
leaders realize at the time how useful the bargaining exercise using “nothing” for 
leverage would be. However, not all units participated in these training sessions. 
2.  Language Training 
The issue of using interpreters was an important one and led to a consistent topic 
in the interviews of language training. This then led to the recommendation that many of 
the interviewed leaders would make; a desire for more language skills among American 
military personnel. Often times one or two non-commissioned officers would be sent to 
receive some training in an Iraqi dialect of Arabic. The training was usually very short 
and was intended for them to come back and train the rest of the company. This was 
usually unrealistic given the difficulty of the Arabic language to learn to expect someone 
with a few hours of training to train others. Usually the second step of the NCOs teaching 
the rest of the company did not happen because the company was busy training other 
                                                 
50 This was in an interview with CPT Michael Gretz and artillery officer who served as an infantry 
platoon leader who conducted operations in northwestern Iraq outside of Mosul during OIF III.  
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situations. Also, having soldiers learn one hundred words of Arabic was not a 
requirement for training handed down from above. 
Language skills were an issue that almost unanimously Company Men across the 
board agreed upon. Even while this issue was being slightly addressed there has been no 
real change in the Army’s approach to teaching languages to the units. In 2006 an effort 
was made to teach more languages to the military and learning a language is now a 
requirement at the Naval Academy but fails to be one at the United States Military 
Academy where arguably the Army could be putting out young officers with a workable 
use of Arabic within two years. This is another area where the Army could enhance its 
ability to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi population. 
Communication was often a problem that was faced in Iraq and interpreters of any 
useful quality were in short supply. Many officers, due to the lack of interpreters, learned 
about 500 words in a month’s time, while fulfilling their job requirements, which made 
their time in Iraq a whole lot easier.51 Simple interview questions used while searching 
homes and cars give units much of the demographic information needed in regards to 
their respective areas of operation. The Iraqis also appreciated it because Americans 
spoke directly to them instead of through an interpreter. Many of the interviewers 
expressed that they had a lot more success with good interpreters while those with weak 
ones suffered many more setbacks, thus reinforcing the need for good language skills. 
Some leaders who served in Iraq did have the mindset that it was not important to 
learn a language. These commanders were more of the types that were into high intensity 
offensive minded operations and therefore were not as interested in conducting 
counterinsurgency operations. This, however, was more of an observation by the 
interviewed Company Men regarding other leaders rather than their own personal beliefs. 
The only interviewees that really held this mindset were those that had spent most of the 
tour on a tank guarding a road and having little to no interaction with the local populous 
during a year’s time of serving there. 
                                                 
51 Personal experience as part of B Company, 1-13 Armor Battalion operarting around Taji, Iraq in 
2005. Other officers that were interviewed had the same experience such as CPT Dennis Faulkner who 
served as a infantry company commander in 1-87th Infantry Battalion in and around Baghdad, to include 
Abu Ghraib, in 2005. 
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3.  Low Intensity Conflict/Counterinsurgency Training 
Another problem among the more junior leaders, was the complete lack of 
training in both investigation and interrogation procedures for leaders in Iraq. There was 
absolutely no training given to these leaders regarding investigation procedures and the 
SOPs were usually something that was made up as a unit proceeded in Iraq. The S2, the 
intelligence shop in a battalion, would usually say to collect as much evidence as possible 
but there was very little knowledge as to what was useful to collect or to note about 
searching a particular house. 
Additionally, there were no set ways of how to accomplish the process of 
gathering and evaluation information and evidence. For instance, there is the story of one 
commander who got very excited that there were empty grain bags in a house. This was 
because during the morning briefing he had learned that the insurgents were using these 
empty grain bags to carry the IEDs to their intended target sites. He completely failed to 
realize he was searching a farm where they used grain to feed the animals. The 
integration of information with knowledge was something that was not always achieved 
with these leaders.  
The above scenario spoke directly to a large problem that was faced by many 
leaders is that the person who was the best at evaluating the information on hand was 
usually not the individual in charge of the unit and therefore was not the individual 
allowed to determine what the evidence meant. There were particular individuals good at 
negotiation but it was not as if they were called upon for their special skills let alone were 
promoted because of their ability to accomplish a task. Many times leaders and soldiers 
would have an understanding of how something was actually occurring only to be told by 
someone higher up in the chain of command that they were in fact wrong and that leader 
would arbitrarily stop that particular subordinate.52 These particular incidences highlight 
some of the major problems within the Army’s structure and rating system today because 
leaders can do this and suffer no repercussions while forcing their subordinates to work in 
spite of their leaders instead of with their leaders. 
                                                 
52 Personal experience in Iraq as well observations of other company grade officers interacting with 
field grade officers in their chain of command. 
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In terms of interrogation, the procedures were predominantly just as poorly set out 
for leaders. It was to a point sometimes where some interviewed leaders did not want to 
share information they had gathered in Iraq with others in their units because they were 
concerned that they would mishandle the information and therefore lose it. This is a 
common problem within a bureaucracy. Interestingly enough information like this was 
withheld by these leaders not as a desire to advance individually but rather help them 
accomplish the organization’s long term goals. Many of the interviewed Company Men 
were often chastised after trying to protect an informants’ anonymity as being soft and 
not willing to understand the harsh realities of war. 
If an individual leader were to acquire a contact that was willing to help the 
Coalition Forces on a condition of relative anonymity another platoon leader or company 
commander, sometimes after receiving this information, would go out into sector and ask 
every Iraqi he ran into where this person was in the most blatantly open way possible. 
This obviously ruined the informant’s desire for relative anonymity. In one instance, one 
of these leaders even found a contact this way who naturally refused to talk to them and 
denied having said anything to Coalition Forces in the first place. This ultimately led to 
the company commander or platoon leader returning to base and declaring that this 
informant was obviously working for the enemy because the informant refused to give 
out any information.53 However, understanding the condition that the informant was 
placed in, with the encounter being in broad daylight in front of a large crowd that in high 
probability had individuals not sympathetic to the American cause, it is not difficult to 
realize why the informant acted in such a way. 
Another story told by a young armor platoon leader highlights almost the same 
incompetence when it came to interrogation of informants. The incident described below 
is similar to other stories described by other interviewees and shows why it is hard to 
gather human intelligence, even disregarding the hurdle posed by a lack of language 
skills. 
 
                                                 
53 Personal experience as an armor platoon leader with B Company, 1-13 Armor north of Baghdad 
during 2005. 
 40
The incident that made me the most upset illustrated why we had failed to 
get any decent intelligence up to that point in the deployment. A few local 
citizens had come to the battalion we shared our FOB (Forward Operating 
Base) with to share info. The information they had concerned our AO 
(area of operations) so the intelligence guys from the other BN brought 
them over.  I sat in on the meeting and watched as our battalion S2, the 
tactical HUMINT team and my company commander managed to alienate 
these men to the point that they basically walked out. The complete lack of 
any skill by all of the people charged with collecting and analyzing 
intelligence absolutely boggled my mind and left me really pissed off.54 
  
This story is typical of the way in which a large number of leaders handled informants 
and indigenous peoples. The story also highlights how the intelligence officers 
themselves had very little training in accomplishing proper human intelligence collection 
as their previous tasks, especially in maneuver battalions, was primarily to analyze 
graphical intelligence and not interrogate humans. 
 The problem also remained that leaders were overall in charge of what came out 
of interrogations. In the case of the story told by the platoon leader, his company 
commander was present at the interrogation and was actually participating in the process. 
The problem with a hierarchical organization is that usually everyone else feeds off of the 
dominant leader in the room, usually determined by rank and not necessarily by level of 
competence in dealing with the situation. In this case, when the interview started to go 
bad everyone else went bad with the leader. It was only when the platoon leader jumped 
in and stopped the direction of the interview that it was it turned around, useful 
information was extracted, and the informants were not alienated beyond working with 
the Americans again in the future.  
 Officers did have professional journals to read before heading over that were 
branch specific and many times would read other branches’ journals as well, especially 
the ones put out by those in infantry because everyone understood that they would most 
likely have to perform that role no matter what their own branch was. However, this was 
all a personal endeavor and in almost all cases was never required and even if it was it 
                                                 
54 This was an interview with CPT Dominic Clemente who served with 2-34 Armor in Baghdad 
during OIF III. 
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was never really enforced. These journals did offer useful insight into what would be 
happening in Iraq but in 2004 they still focused on Battle of Fallujah type scenarios 
where it would be mid to high intensity urban operations everyday while serving in Iraq. 
There was very little at that time that dealt specifically with the issue of a 
counterinsurgency. 
 One of the most important tools that were used by commanders was shared 
experiences by others. Journals did a little towards this end but it was the face to face 
interaction with other soldiers and leaders who had served in Iraq that was crucial. In an 
armor battalion that had served in Iraq during OIF I their experiences were not in how to 
clear buildings but in how to meet people and build relationships. The experiences faced 
by this battalion during OIF III were much more inline with those than they were with the 
Fallujah urban warfare mindset that seemingly dominated the scholarly journals. 
 Also of great importance was the left seat/right seat rides conducted by new units 
with the units they were replacing in Iraq. While all the training had been geared towards 
Iraq, the only way to understand one’s sector completely was to learn from those that had 
been their immediately before them. Again with the armor battalion they had a bad 
experience during OIF I of the battalion replacing them completely ignoring them and in 
many of their views contributing to the rise of the Mehdi and militia and the situation in 
Sadr City that ended up extending the tours of many in Iraq that were headed for home. 
 In that light, many Company Men learned as much as they could about the area 
from the units that they were replacing because there was a general understanding that is 
where the best information would come from. In one case the previous platoon had 
written up SOPs based on all their experiences in Iraq during OIF II and the follow on 
platoon just adopted those SOPs and saw their time in Iraq as casualty free.55 
                                                 
55 This was my personal experience as an armor platoon leader in 1-13 Armor Battalion replacing a 
cavalry platoon from the 39th Brigade on Taji, Iraq in 2005. 
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C.  WHAT DID LEADERS PERCEIVE AS THEIR METRICS FOR 
SUCCESS? 
The Metrics for Success are specifically what tasks did leaders have to 
accomplish for their own leaders to consider their roles in Iraq to be a success. For 
instance in Vietnam there was the issue of enemy killed and ammunition expended that 
was used as a gauge for success. Asking this question was mean to garner different 
responses then those but hopefully elicit some sort of set answer for what leaders thought 
they had to do to be successful. 
In asking this question the intent was to garner information in regards to what 
junior leaders actually thought that they had to accomplish in an objective way in order 
for their missions in Iraq to be a success. However, the responses of this question were 
varied. There were the originally intended answers which were expressed by an armor 
platoon leader who stated “if I were in my tank going down the road and saw an 
insurgent on the side of the road putting in an IED and I killed that insurgent with my 
rifle from the top of my tank, the impression I had was that would be crowning 
achievement and I would receive a ‘gold star’ on my report.”56 However, the answers 
were more varied and many times people were allowed to choose their mission as long as 
they would just leave their area of operations better than they found it. 
Since the most objective answer was the one with regards to the “gold star” the 
discussion will start there. While there was never a set list of tasks to be completed to be 
sent back up through the chain of command to the leadership in Washington D.C. to be 
evaluated as success or failure there still was a vastly predominant notion in Iraq that a 
high enemy body count was a desired end-state. While it was only about half the leaders 
that had this experience it still ran through the organization as a whole, because 
somewhere in the chain of command there was usually a leader with this mentality. This  
                                                 
56 This was an interview with CPT Robert Gregory, an armor platoon leader with 2-70th Armor 
Battalion who operated our Taji, Iraq. As an armor platoon leader he conducted most of his operations with 
tanks on the main supply routes. IED refers to an improvised explosive device, usually an artillery round or 
some type of explosive hooked up to an initiating device that could be set off remotely through the use of 
walkie-talkies or even a long wire and a battery. Also, “gold star” is an expression, similar to what a child 
would receive in elementary school for doing well; it is not a military term or award. 
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is not entirely unusual because most people when they signed up for the Army in a 
combat arms branch, or any Marine for that matter, they signed up under the premise that 
they might in fact have to kill people at some point in their careers. 
Insurgent body counts were always something that was a highly valued 
commodity among leaders. There was never a leader in any of the interviews that had the 
idea that their commanders thought that dead insurgents were a bad thing. What varied 
was when it was appropriate to kill an insurgent. Even in 2007 and 2008, one could 
hardly turn on the news without hearing about how many insurgents were killed. This is 
even in light of General Petraeus attempting to restructure the strategy in Iraq supporting 
the view in counterinsurgency that often times for every one enemy that is killed two take 
their place. According to Field Manual 3-24, “However, killing every insurgent is 
normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it 
risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and 
producing cycles of revenge.” 57 
This notion of having to kill the enemy in many units was key but accomplishing 
the act was very confusing for soldiers. There was what seemed like a constant effort to 
draw the enemy out to fight so that we could kill them, but there really was not a clue as 
to how to accomplish this task. If there were ever any doubt about a kill a soldier would 
be questioned over and over again as to why he shot someone. By contrast, one of the 
biggest successes that a brigade commander noted from his unit’s tour during OIF III 
when he was able to kill approximately ten armed insurgents by surrounding them with 
ground forces and then killing the main group with an F-16 strike and letting the Apache 
Helicopters pick off the rest of the insurgents. No matter how many civil projects were 
completed or even more military goals like detaining insurgents with very useful 
intelligence or finding weapons caches with thousands of rounds in them this brigade  
                                                 
57 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters Department of the Army and Marine Corps, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 1-23. 
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commander would constantly regale this tale as one of his brigade’s most outstanding 
achievements and in many instances completely ignore that any of those other metrics 
had been accomplished.58 
There were many times that objective metrics were needed for day to day 
operations. In many cases platoons’ experiences were made a whole lot smoother and 
given direction and guidelines that could easily be met. By having a set list of things that 
had to be accomplished, the platoon had a set of tasks and standards instead of just being 
out there to patrol for the sake of patrolling and ending up as one platoon sergeant stated 
that he ended up “…feeling like we were just the little toy ducks in the shooting gallery 
going back and forth, providing targets of opportunity to the insurgents.”59 This really 
depended on battalion leadership. On the one hand, if the battalion commander wanted to 
direct things then missions were very rarely allowed to deviate from the standard 
“patrolling for the sake of patrolling.”60 On the other hand, if the decisions were pushed 
down to the company commanders then the missions became more focused on 
completing tasks and less so about being in sector just to have troops in sector. 
Therefore, when the platoons had set metrics, instead of being told to patrol for 
eight hours and conduct “counterinsurgency operations,” the platoons were instead given 
lists of things that had to be done the interviewees felt that they had more of a sense of 
purpose and direction. This created a sense of accomplishment and boundaries when the 
list was completed, the mission was done. The tasks would consist of stopping and 
searching a set number of cars, a set number of houses, and talking to various people to 
gain information. This information would range from insurgency operations to talking 
about what was needed in the area to improve it regarding to area improvement with 
consideration to civil projects and the like. This means of gathering information very 
                                                 
58 This was COL David Bishop, commander of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armor Division. 3rd 
BCT was attached to 3rd Infantry Division during OIF III and was based out of FOB Taji. 
59 This was an interview with an SFC Darren Shepherd an armor platoon sergeant that had the mission 
of driving up and down a road constantly for 24 hours until they were replaced by another unit who would 
do the same thing. The only reason that people were out there patrolling for 24 hours is because the road 
had to be protected to bring the supplies out for the people patrolling. It was a very circular justification for 
a mission. 
60 A common statement made by many junior officers and soldiers operating in Iraq. It also came up in 
numerous interviews with platoon leaders discussing their units in Iraq not having a defined end state so 
they just had platoons out in sector conducting route security or preventing IEDs from being emplaced. 
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rarely led to anything of military use in finding insurgents and therefore loss favor with 
the more high intensity driven chain of command.61  
It was in light of these relatively unsuccessful yields that this way of doing 
missions quickly met its demise because the units were never in one place for long 
enough to develop the relationships that were needed to create trust and respect so 
valuable information and contacts were more easily attainable. On top of that, platoons 
would often time accomplish the missions in less than an hour and consider their patrol 
finished which, as they would find out later, was not the intent. The fact that units would 
rarely ever give platoon leaders anything with which to bargain with the locals did not 
help either. Therefore meaningful engagement with the population was very limited.  
Many of the Company Men interviewed also had a sense of what was most 
important to their leaders in terms of metrics, even though it was not explicitly stated. 
Alternately, with this, there were many discussions with Company Men that had good 
relations with their superior officers and therefore did not feel the need to accomplish 
certain goals but were entrusted to secure their areas relatively free of micromanagement. 
These individual Company Men really decided what was important and what was not in 
their own units. In one battalion digging up caches of bombs that were being used for 
IEDs was of great importance but not as much so as watching the road to make sure no 
IEDs were buried along side of the road to be set off against a convoy. 
For many battalion commanders there was this overarching need and desire to 
stop IED attacks. This was a common theme among most of those interviewed.62 The 
success and failure of the battalion in these commander’s eyes was the number of attacks 
on American patrols. In certain cases a bomb going off even resulted in whoever was 
patrolling at the time to receive a lecture from their superiors that they were not patrolling 
enough, regardless of the situation. This was particularly frustrating for many leaders 
                                                 
61 Both of these means of interrogation had little measure of success. Information usually came from 
being able to create a relationship with the local populace and since there was such a turnover in our sector 
there was never the time to form these relationships. On top of that the units that I worked with often did 
little to help in sector and we were often told to tell the Iraqis that this was the job of the Iraqi government, 
not ours. The Iraqis would argue that their government was corrupt and would not do anything for them but 
I had nothing to offer. 
62 Unanimously this was an understood goal for all units operating in Iraq. There were varying 
methods, however, on how to accomplish this end state. 
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because the battalion would rarely have any intelligence, especially when first arriving in 
their sector, about who was conducting these attacks, where they were coming from and 
why were they so adamant about attacking Americans. Without this information, 
patrolling was generally ineffective.  
One instance particularly highlights the breakdown of communication that 
occurred between Company Men and their superiors. A grain bag filled with an artillery 
round, a blasting cap and a wire were found fifty feet away from the road on the other 
side of a dirt berm from the road. This was a common practice for insurgents to pre-
position these bags full of rounds so that they could drive back at a later time and then 
place alongside the road connect it to a detonator. This way if they were searched 
travelling to or from the site they would have nothing suspicious on them and be allowed 
through. 
When this prepositioned IED was found it was called up as a prepositioned IED 
and the battalion in question had a fit from the S3 to the battalion commander. They 
demanded to know why an IED had been placed alongside the road while a platoon had 
been securing the route all day and night for the past week. The platoon sergeant and 
platoon leader called back numerous times stating that it was a prepositioned bag and had 
not yet been hooked up to a detonator and was not anywhere near enough to the road to 
cause damage to anyone especially since it was on the other side of a ten foot high and 
twenty foot wide dirt berm. They also informed them if they looked at the satellite 
imagery and the ten digit grid location that had been sent up they would see that it was 
not “on” or “by” the road.63 
                                                 
63 Personal experience operating with 1-320 Field Artillery Battalion on the eastern edge of the Anbar 
province in 2005. I had to explain five times to different officers in my chain of command and various 
operations officers that it was not an IED on the side of the road. Instead it was one all prepared to be 
moved up to the side of the road for an attack. This was actually valuable insight for us on how the 
insurgents were moving the IEDs in stages to the attack site without being discovered. This information, 
however, was lost on my chain of command that was too busy trying to blame someone for something that 
never happened. 
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This occasion highlights the complete breakdown in communication that would 
often happen between the Company Men and their superiors. It also highlights how in a 
large number of incidences battalion leadership often made decisions with almost no 
knowledge of the situation or even understanding of how the enemy would attack. 
However, they were still in charge and had the ultimate control of how to respond. These 
broken feedback loops left many Company Men feeling like they were spinning their 
wheels trying to explain situations to their bosses. The senior leaders seemed to care little 
about the situation and more about keywords like IEDs, insurgents, captured, and killed.  
The worst thing to do in one particular battalion was to fire one’s weapon, 
whether it was a warning shot, testing the weapons, an accident, or at the enemy. At least 
half of the incidents of firing one’s weapon involved the Company Man seeing the 
battalion commander and explaining why, with carrying a standard load of 210 .556 
rounds for their M4 Assault Rifle and 30 9mm rounds for their Pistols, the soldiers 
believed they had any right to shoot at anything.64 This was typified by the previous 
example of negligent discharges which many interviewees collaborated.  
With the change of leadership came a change in views and goals. Another 
battalion commander had a more typical view in Iraq of “we’re going to take the fight to 
the enemy.” If one fired their weapon he wanted to know why there were no dead bodies. 
The obsession for watching the road got pushed to the backburner replaced by raids and 
cordon and searches until his battalion lost six soldiers in two weeks to IEDs, then there 
was a massive emphasis put on this mission. This speaks to the only feedback that leaders 
are still measured by and that is high intensity conflict metrics. This battalion’s 
commander had no incentive to change his actions until he lost all those men and by the 
time he “got it” he was understandably moved by his own leaders to a less dangerous 
FOB security mission.65 
This ability by company commanders to still be able to innovate somewhat speaks 
to the ability to have some fraction of the decision-making on the company level. On the 
                                                 
64 Personal experience in Iraq during 2005 revealed that many companies and platoons lowered the 
amount of required ammunition. The sentiment was commonly that if they are not going to fire their 
weapons then why carry around the extra ammunition. 
65 This was personal experience working with 1-320 Field Artillery Battalion in 2005 in the eastern 
Anbar province. The battalion prided itself on “taking the fight to the enemy.” 
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whole though, there was generally a shared sentiment among platoon leaders that there 
was not nearly as much room for innovation or recommendations at the platoon level. 
This innovation was generally stifled no matter what kind of leader they were, instead it 
was basically agreed upon by most leaders that lieutenants should not be involved too 
much in innovative non-doctrinal procedures because of their rank. Even the interviewed 
company commanders that seemed to have relatively successful tours with very few 
casualties still all seem to be agreed upon the fact that platoon leaders were young and 
inexperienced and therefore should not be given a lot of leeway.  
It was in light of one of these discussions with an armor company commander that 
the notion of a “1st lieutenant who knew everything” came up and he quickly explained 
that lieutenants did not understand the intricacies involved in the decision-making 
process. He would explain that leaders higher up had more information, with more assets, 
and so they had a better understanding of what was happening in the big picture in Iraq.66 
This assertion was made not only by this interviewee but also by others referring to their 
leaders who had almost word for word had the same things to say about them. One of the 
interviewees who was a platoon leader heard about these “1st lieutenants who knew 
everything” and said that he had been told the same exact thing in Iraq. 
The interesting thing about this notion is why it was such a common occurrence 
and referenced by so many company commanders and above. The same interviewee 
proffered the notion that lieutenants in Iraq did not know any better. The role of a 
lieutenant when he first shows up to unit, whether in peace time or at war, is to figure the 
ins and outs of his job quickly. In Iraq when things start to go bad and attacks increase, 
these lieutenants lacking the years of experience that their own leaders have within the 
Army immediately turn from anything doctrinal towards whatever works. This is not to 
say that the lieutenant did not know anything about his job but rather to point out the fact 
that they did not find themselves bound by the same bureaucratic culture that even the 
company commanders, only one position higher than them in the chain of command, 
found themselves bound to. 
                                                 
66 Personal experience revealed that these concerns did have some validity as sectarian violence 
spiraled out of control in 2006 despite our warnings. A situation that a few of us know-it-alls pointed out to 
our leaders when it was beginning to happen but was not treated with any amount of urgency. 
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This same phenomenon was noticed when talking to the fire support officers 
(FSO). In a traditional high intensity conflict these officers would be with their team 
traveling with the unit or scouting out ahead and calling back grids for where they wanted 
artillery fired. In the new low intensity conflict, these leaders were some of the first to 
lose their jobs. In Iraq they would end up filling all sorts of rolls from platoon leaders and 
company commanders for maneuver elements, a role usually filled by infantry or armor 
personnel, to a myriad of others to include training the Iraqi Army, civil affairs, and 
interrogation teams. 
Almost all of these leaders agreed that they had to relinquish any previous notions 
about what they thought their jobs might be or what they thought it might entail. They 
were also very used to operating on their own without very specific guidance. An FSO 
who was tasked with training Iraqi forces summed it up perfectly when he said “we’re 
FSO’s and we’re kind of used to doing our own thing anyway,” when he was asked about 
training the Iraqi Army without any particular guidance from his chain of command 
except to make them better than they were.67 
There was a lack of cohesion among the different Iraqi units. If an officer had 
been give complete leeway to conduct operations as he saw fit when it came to 
integrating into the larger structure, everything that they had worked on was almost for 
naught because it did not translate into working with other units. Many times the official 
trainers that the Army would send to Iraq would have to start from scratch because there 
was not any sharing of how things were being done from unit to unit. 
In general, company commanders were satisfied with the amount of autonomy 
that they received. There was one exception—a company commander who had his 
battalion commander dictate to him every move that he made in regards to any mission. If 
the company commander believed that other things had to be done, it was to be without 
the battalion commander knowing about it. In light of this situation this commander was  
                                                 
67 CPT Matthew Wehri who served as an FSO as well as Iraqi Army trainer with 1-21 Field Artillery 
in Baghdad during 2004. 
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still able to affect a lot of change within his company. When he took over he reduced 
their casualties to zero for the second half of that company’s tour, which led many of his 
men to say that they would follow him to the bitter end. 
One thing that was constantly addressed in the interviews was that of what is 
referred to as a SWEAT (Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics and Trash) analysis. 
This was a mission given out to various platoons to analyze the SWEAT capabilities of 
any given area. While nearly everyone interviewed dealt with this mission, almost 
unanimously this mission was seen as one of the least important tasks. This feeling was 
not only felt in the analysis itself but in the desire by the interviewees’ respective 
battalions to do anything about improving these respective areas within their sectors. 
Often times these missions were handed over to the various civil affairs units attached to 
the brigades and left for them to develop. Almost unanimously the respondents all said in 
hindsight that they probably should have made this their primary mission while they were 
in Iraq with reduced attacks being viewed as one way of measuring their improvement 
within this framework but not the primary way of viewing it.  
This would almost suggest that information does flow up the chain of command 
because eventually General Petraeus would be put in charge of Iraq and would emphasize 
that things like SWEAT were at least equal to if not more important tasks than those of 
raids and offensive operations.68 However, most of these Company Men stated this after 
studying counterinsurgency operations in various Army schools and almost all of them 
admitted that they knew very little about it before they had done this, that they had only 
known that whatever was happening in Iraq, in terms of mid intensity offensive minded 
operations, was not working.  
The last issue with the metrics of success was that of reporting progress. It is 
pretty typical in the United States Military that when something is sent down from higher 
as requirement to be done and is expected to be reported back up the chain of command, 
that short of not having a physical item needed to fulfill that requirement regardless of  
                                                 
68 Lt. Gen David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq, 
Military Review 4 (January-February 2006), 10. 
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cost, that issue will not be reported back up to higher as anything less than completed and 
that everything is good to go. The general sense was and always has been “just do it” and 
any reason why a Company Man could not accomplish a mission was not to do with a 
problem with the situation or the mission, but because they were an ineffective leader.  
This general sense shared by most of the interviewed Company Men obviously 
has a huge impact on feedback loops and information. Tasks like this would occur in Iraq 
in regards to safety training and the like. Most people would do this required training in 
whatever small amount of time they had, sometimes in the middle of patrolling out in 
sector by pulling into a secluded area setting up security and conducting training. There 
was a sizeable minority though that just reported up the chain of command tasks like 
these as being completed even though they were not. Even if there were those junior 
leaders that reported it up to higher command that there was no time and this absolutely 
could not happen without more time and resources, it was a lot of time glossed over at the 
next level as being completed and the report was sent up as completed at that level.  
In summary, leaders would find weird ways of accomplishing the mission or 
would just plain lie. If leaders were not as much concerned about how they were viewed 
by their commanders then someone further up the chain of command or in the line of the 
transmission of information would usually just lie for them. This particular situation most 
grossly manifested itself in the training of Iraqi security forces. In an interview with a 
Marine in charge of the training of border security regarding the altering of reports the 
answer to the question of whether it happened was very blatantly “yes, reports were 
altered all the time.”69 This interviewee pointed out that he would often report that these 
units were not at all ready in many regards and were not progressing no matter how much 
effort was put towards them but when he reported it up his chain of command the reports 
were altered as they continued up the chain so as to show that the Iraqi units were 
progressing in their readiness to operate on their own. Again this shows a fear of 
repercussion within the hierarchy. Problems were not being proffered up for resolution 
but rather to be solved at the lowest level possible. 
                                                 
69 This was in an interview with MAJ Andrew Merz, a Marine field artillery officer whose job as a 
captain was to train the Iraq border control from spring 2005 to spring 2006. While Andrew was not in the 
Army the superiors that he reported to were. 
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D.  DID METRICS HAMPER WHAT LEADERS BELIEVED NEED TO BE 
DONE? 
 Many leaders did not want to think of their tour in Iraq as unproductive.  They 
wanted to feel good about what was accomplished. Nevertheless, people learn more from 
failure than success.  As one company commander noted when faced with the question of 
whether or not these metrics hampered mission accomplishment: 
 
Yes, now my higher chain of command had a certain way of doing things.  
And there was no middle road.  You had to follow to the letter on what 
had to be done.  I mean whenever I did a company cordon and search the 
battalion commander wanted me to have a plan to position each and every 
squad vehicle. To me that is  micromanagement.  It totally cut out the 
platoon leaders.  But to counter that I did the plan and showed it to the 
platoon leader’s to see if it would work.  And if it worked then I would 
bring it to the battalion commander.  But once he saw it, he would change 
it. I felt like why was I here? Why don’t you run the company!!!70 
 
In fact there were more than a few of micromanaging battalion commanders in the United 
States Military in Iraq. This micromanagement and unwillingness to listen was a 
common, especially in regards to feedback from their subordinates. The Army “works” 
when feedback loops are working, when the plan is disseminated, and when junior 
leaders report to their superiors with recommendations based on their own capabilities. 
When these loops are completely closed there is no sharing of information. Often, 
feedback stopped at the lowest levels of leadership in the Army. One lieutenant describes 
how his feedback was received during his interactions with many of his superiors: 
 
Yes, at the lowest levels not so much although there were definitely 
thoroughly guided plans disseminated in order to conduct missions, but 
the problem was there was no chance of feedback or adding to decision- 
 
 
                                                 
70 Interview with a company commander regarding the planning of company sized raids on targets. He 
insisted on anonymity when conducting this interview because he was still concerned about repercussions 
from above. 
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making process in order to diversify and benefit the mission. It was the 
“this is how we will do it, and if you don’t like it get promoted,” persona 
although not said in so many words.71 
 
This lieutenant was saying that one needed to stay within their role and to follow superior 
officers without question. The only time that one would be able to change this system is 
when they were to obtain a promotion and effect the change themselves. This lack of 
feedback going up the chain of command due to rank hindered the effectiveness of the 
Army in achieving its goals in Iraq. 
 Another theme that emerged in the interviews was that platoon and company 
commanders stated that the battalion level operations that they conducted were almost 
entirely useless. Very rarely did they gather anything useful and if they did, it was 
something that could have been done with a platoon size element or at most a company 
sized element. Respondents spoke many times of losing the element of surprise because 
all the Iraqis within their sectors knew what was happening when the entire battalion 
launched an operation.  
 In some instances, there was a need to conduct these operations so that the 
battalion commander could fulfill a requirement to conduct these operations whether or 
not they were needed. These kinds of operations undermined friendly relations with the 
local population, which were needed for success. The battalion commanders would be so 
obsessed with trying to prove to their own commanders that they were following orders 
that they cut all feedback from below that did not support this objective. 
 In one instance, an infantry company commander pointed out that he could 
accomplish a mission by using one platoon instead of an entire battalion, thereby 
allowing his company and all the other companies in the battalion to continue their 
missions. The battalion commander would have none of it and the company commander 
stopped asking for permission to do this once he finally realized that the battalion 
commander was actually tracking all these battalion size missions as accomplishments 
for his battalion. 
                                                 
71 Interview with CPT Christian Colby, a fire support officer who also doubled as platoon leader in 1-
13 Armor Battalion north of Baghdad during 2005. 
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 Aside from complaining about the stifling situations that many Company Men 
found themselves in there were some other valuable patterns and insights in answers to 
this question. One was that a large number of interviewees really did not even know what 
exactly they were trying to accomplish and what the overall end state was supposed to be 
so they were unsure of how to answer the question. Even when terms of platoon leaders’ 
missions and patrols were not dictated to them they often found themselves with their 
platoons patrolling for the sake of patrolling and having no goal. There was some 
confusion as to what patrolling was actually supposed to accomplish. This led to a 
frustrating sense of just driving around and accomplishing nothing towards a larger goal. 
Again, if someone complained to their leaders that they were accomplishing nothing, the 
commander would usually regard that individual as being lazy for not coming up with 
something to do on their own. Even if this did not occur the fear of it happening was a 
common theme among respondents that effectively stifled most feedback.72 
 The company commanders that were allowed great flexibility also experienced 
frustration but on a less immediate scale and a much deeper long term scale. For the most 
part when the interviewed company commanders regaled their stories they said that they 
were able to bring about a relative calm in their area and in some cases see a turnaround 
in the city in terms of decreasing violence and increasing areas such as the economy, 
education and overall improvement of the neighborhood. This all would inevitably be lost 
to the follow on unit, who much to the chagrin of the interviewees, would immediately 
adopt their own way of doing things and lose everything that was gained. 
 The issue of the follow on unit is a very important because it is where continuity 
is lost. Continuity is a very important requirement for low intensity conflicts because it 
allows leaders to interact with the populations within their sectors without having to 
rebuild all their relations. In almost every scenario the new units would come and 
immediately start conducting operations in the manner that they saw fit to do so. This was 
an issue from platoon to platoon all the way up to division to division. 
                                                 
72 This is common in most bureaucracies and the Army in Iraq was no exception. My own personal 
experience in Iraq in 2005 verified this as well as many of the interviews conducted with the platoon 
leaders and company commanders.  
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 Though there are particular stories about this happening that were unsettling there 
is one that stands out in the interviews as being particularly poignant. A company 
commander had received an email from another company commander who was currently 
serving over in Iraq. This company commander said that he had obtained his name from 
the local Iraqis in his sector that said that this company commander was really a good guy 
to work with. This company commander then asked the interviewee whether or not he 
had any information regarding this sector and the indigenous population. The interviewed 
company commander replied with all the knowledge he knew from his memory but other 
than that, he had very little to offer the new company commander because no military 
personnel serving in Iraq are allowed to bring any official military information home with 
them regarding Iraq and Coalition Forces’ operations there. Even more frustrating for the 
interviewed commander is apparently the ten plus pounds of paperwork and over two 
gigabytes of information they had collected on the sector regarding the people who lived 
there, intelligence that had been gathered, status of projects and various contacts and 
informants had all been lost or discarded.73 
 There are a myriad of different explanations for this. In the Army there is a desire 
to be viewed as go getter, innovative, and offensive in their mindset and following what 
the previous unit did does not make a leader stand out. Also, there are a large number of 
occasions were the previous unit was not that successful and one would be an idiot to 
follow in their footsteps. The main problem existed when the previous unit had evolved 
into a counterinsurgency operation only to have it all be ended by the follow on unit who 
was going to “take the fight to the enemy.” The biggest problem though is probably the 
lack of coherent ideas prior to late 2006 on what do in Iraq.  
 All interviewees noted that they lacked a doctrinally set way of gathering and 
transferring information to the next units that would follow on after them. As pointed out 
in the answers to the question regarding pre-deployment training, the U.S. military did  
not have a set way of collecting information that could be transferred on to other people  
                                                 
73 CPT Dennis Faulkner who served as a infantry company commander in 1-87th Infantry Battalion in 
and around Baghdad, to include Abu Ghraib, in 2005. 
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and units. This meant that many times while information would be transferred it would 
often times end up being viewed as entirely useless because the receiving unit did not 
know how to interpret it or use it.  
E.  HOW MUCH AUTHORITY WERE LEADERS ABLE TO EXERCISE? 
 As seen earlier there were already many restrictions placed on quite a few of these 
leaders. As on interviewee aptly put it “it seemed as if all the leadership was completely 
risk averse, where is the ability to show audacity and take risks, of course thinking about 
it first.”74 He acknowledged that it was important to go through risk mitigation 
procedures but theatre wide there were rules of engagement (ROEs) as well as theatre 
wide standard operating procedures (SOPs) which were very stifling to operations. For 
example in the sector where the aforementioned interviewee was working there were no 
IEDs at all since the war began. His unit would have to travel over vast tracts of land. 
They would have to take up-armored HMMWVs with fuelers and make a giant convoy 
out of the whole operation whenever they went to check on some of the far outlying 
posts. The British troops, however, that drove on the same 100 mile stretch of road were 
allowed to downgrade their vehicles to unarmored ones that could make the entire trek 
without refilling and go twice as fast. There was no credence given to the practicality of 
the specific issue, just to the adherence of the SOPs. 
 In a counterinsurgency these SOPs were unbending and unalterable. There was no 
room for discussion because of the lack of feedback loops. The main reason for this was 
that no one wanted to be responsible for anything going wrong. If a unit decided that they 
want to change an SOP and something were to go wrong then all the leaders would be 
held accountable because they had not followed standard procedures. Again, everything 
was all about perceptions and what Company Men thought their leaders would blame 
them for if they took initiative.  
  
                                                 
74 This was an interview with MAJ Andrew Merz, a Marine field artillery officer whose job as a 
captain was to train the Iraq border control from spring 2005 to spring 2006. 
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 There was a lot of this worrying about protection and it is evident as being an 
Army wide phenomenon. While this is not inherently a bad thing, consideration should 
be given to specific instances where standard procedures may not be applicable. When 
one of the company commanders saw the picture in Figure 1 of soldiers in Iraq, he 
reacted nearly the same exact way as many other company commanders who saw the 
same picture. It shows a tank sitting in a field, one soldier was sitting on top looking one 
way while sitting behind the M2 .50 caliber machine gun and had a set of binoculars next 
to him, the radio microphones as well as his M16 Assault Rifle. The two other soldiers 
were sitting in lawn chairs next to the tank with their weapons connected to them and 
drinking Gatorade. This interviewee immediately commented that everyone should be 
inside of the tank and no one should be sky-lining himself on the top of the tank. He was 
saying that these soldiers were totally vulnerable to sniper fire. It could also just as easily 
be viewed as all the soldiers having their weapons on hand, their uniforms on (except for 
the one with his chin strap undone on his helmet) and all were alert and at their posts 
even though the soldier on the tank was the only one who was supposed to be on guard 
duty. On top of all of this it was about 115° Fahrenheit out and approximately 10° to 20° 
hotter than that inside the tank. 
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Figure 1. This is a typical mission of a static guard duty on a road to ensure there 
were no IEDs emplaced along side the road. The soldiers have been on this mission for 
approximately 8 hours at this time and it is approximately 115° Fahrenheit outside. 
 
There would be many times when the battalion commander of these soldiers at the 
time would come out and immediately start criticizing everything about similar scenarios 
like this one, much like the interviewed company commander. This particular battalion 
commander was an extreme form of a trait that a lot of leaders exhibited over in Iraq, 
experienced by both myself personally and a majority of the interviewees in one form or 
another. There was an extreme sense of fear in these leaders. They would lose a soldier 
and being unable to grasp at why that had happened would instead resort to their old 
high-intensity combat training of how to secure a road a site in order to ensure that no 
one got killed. This meant 24 hours presence on the roads so as to ensure that no bombs 
would be emplaced.  
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This was yet another example of a breakdown in feedback loops because if any 
Company Man mentioned something like sleep deprivation to his leaders his fortitude 
and that of his soldiers would be questioned. The issue of sleep deprivation was a huge 
problem in Iraq but one that was almost unanimously disregarded among battalion, if not 
company, and higher leadership in Iraq. The old mindset still pervaded that soldiers had 
to stay awake through the night if they were to guard anything. This mindset could not be 
changed no matter what evidence was presented to the leaders.  
This fear of losing soldiers or vehicles was something that was inherent 
throughout Iraq when talking with many of these leaders. Keeping people alive is always 
a good thing but at the point that you are taking unnecessary measures to do so is where 
one has to be careful, especially when these measures lower the overall mission 
effectiveness and put more soldiers’ lives at risk in the long run. For instance, there was 
the public backlash of soldiers’ in Iraq not having up-armored HMMWVs to conduct 
operations with. There was a substantial loss of life because of this too. However, the 
backlash was such that one had to have up-armored vehicles for all missions no matter 
what. So, as with the story above regarding HMMWVs, countless dollars and time was 
lost because of this absolute requirement that was placed upon them. 
These requirements also lent themselves to a risk adverse posture. If anyone were 
to suggest that using an un-armored vehicle was better in any given situation, they would 
be immediately crucified by superiors and peers alike if he were to suffer any sort of 
injury or damage that may have been prevented by an armored vehicle. This would even 
occur if the leader had taken all the appropriate risk mitigation procedures required and 
had determined the risk was low. 
In terms of risk, no one below brigade commander was allowed to make any 
significant changes to the SOPs regarding the minimum size of a patrol or the amount 
protection any soldier would be wearing at any given time outside of the wire. In many 
respects this was expected because there were instances that people would think they 
were safe and drive out into sector with only one HMMWV and end up being killed. 
However, in other instances, there would in often cases end up being so many restrictive 
SOPs that the soldiers would end up feeling overwhelmed and just ignore some SOPs 
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altogether. This was the case with the standard load of ammunition that each soldier was 
supposed to have on themselves at all times. 
The standard load of ammunition that most units usually adopted was that of at 
least 210 rounds of .556 for the assault rifles. The only problem with this scenario is that 
it did not apply across the board to all situations. For instance soldiers on tanks could not 
wear all of that on their vest or they might find themselves stuck in the hatch of the tank. 
This was a much more dangerous scenario since a soldier would more likely have to duck 
inside in case of being shot at, rolling over or in the case an explosion. Immediately 
leaders, both those questioned, and those discussed in the interviews, would offer up a 
myriad of solutions so that the SOP could be met instead of discussing the SOP itself. For 
instance such solutions as putting all one’s ammunition on a vest that one would wear 
over their armor were recommended to meet the SOP. Therefore, the importance of SOPs 
was a significant factor in how missions were accomplished. 
Whether or not a leader agrees with the above scenario the pattern that arises out 
of all the interviews is an inherent sense of wanting to justify these SOPs as being useful 
instead of questioning them for their own merits. Many would argue that this is because 
the military is an inherently SOP driven organization. However, the effectiveness of these 
SOPs is called into question in a low intensity conflict environment. This is because of 
the need for adaptability and the understanding that different areas of operations call for 
different ways of dealing with the problems in the areas. The above scenario may be 
justifiable to most leaders but others like removing your helmet when interviewing locals 
so one does not look a like a six foot four inch agent of destruction would just as easily 
send others into immediately questioning the sanity of such an act. Some would say it is 
okay if you do it inside, others if you do outside but under relative concealment, and still 
others would say that any time an individual makes an assessment of an area he or she 
should base their decision off of that.  
F.  WHO DEVELOPED THE METRICS FOR SUCCESS? 
 This was a very difficult question for many people to answer. The Army in 
general works by a subordinate being evaluated by the leader above the subordinate and 
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then that evaluation is confirmed by the next higher on the chain of command. For the 
most part in Iraq, Company Men said that they were pretty much given free reign to do 
what they wanted, short of killing people for no reason. However, there were instances 
that the battalion commander did reach down and dictate how operations were going to 
occur to the very lowest levels. 
 In 1-13 Armor Battalion and 3rd Brigade Combat Team almost everything that 
was determined to be a success were the expectations set forth by the battalion and 
brigade commanders. Whatever was important to these individuals was what was 
important to everyone below them. There were occasions that Company Men were able 
to change their minds especially if what they were doing was more glorious than what the 
unit was currently accomplishing. In terms of the overall Coalition Forces mission in Iraq 
a lot of the interviewees had the same goals. Those were basically to ensure freedom of 
movement of Coalition Forces, to kill or capture Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) and provide the 
framework for democracy in Iraq. 
 Interestingly enough when missions that had an actual end-state in mind the 
Coalition Forces responded extremely well. For instance both the elections that occurred 
in 2005 to ratify the constitution and then to elect the new permanent government under 
that constitution went extremely well with no major attacks in all of Iraq. For both of 
these days there was an expectation of a huge battle in nearly all the operations orders 
handed out throughout Iraq and yet when the day came the Coalition Forces had locked 
down all vehicular traffic and were guarding all the roads, while the Iraqi Army was 
charged with guarding the polling sites. This led one soldier to comment during the 
second election that he wished every day in Iraq was Election Day.  
G.  SUMMARY 
 One can see from the interviews the many resistances that are inherent within the 
Army system as a whole. To summarize a few consistent themes there is almost a 
complete breakdown in feedback loops, especially those coming up from below. There is 
still a traditional mindset of having to conduct high intensity offensive operations in Iraq 
and doing such for many leaders, both company and higher, is the only way of effectively 
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advancing their careers. There is also a fear of repercussion that stifles the system at 
almost any level. The Company Men also agreed for the most part that complaining or 
pointing out was wrong in the Army was not a good way to advance, in spite of this, most 
of them complained anyway because they thought it was the right thing to do. In the next 
Chapter there will be a closer look at what exactly all this means and see where the Army 
is a learning organization and where it has essentially stifled this innovation.  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A.  CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis explained the decision-making processes at company level combat 
units operating within Iraq. It also showed the level of effectiveness of feedback loops as 
they exist in the Army today. Based on this level of operations, has the Army become a 
learning organization capable of adapting to the nonconventional environment of 
counterinsurgency operations? It has been the goal of the Army to become a more 
effective and adaptive force since the perceived loss in Vietnam. Improvements have 
been made not only in technology and tactics but also in the incentives structure of 
soldiers and officers operating in the Army. It is in this last area of incentives, however, 
that has all but hampered the Army from becoming an effective learning organization. 
B.  COMMAND CLIMATE 
It became apparent about the decision-making process in the Army that individual 
leaders had a lot of control over what happened under their leadership. An intelligent and 
well intentioned officer could for the most part filter out information and directives that 
did not make sense and give leaders under him a positive and open environment. 
Relatively straightforward missions, however, could be misinterpreted by leaders who 
were more intent on such notions as “taking the fight to the enemy” instead of 
counterinsurgency operations and this could make the environment under them more 
ineffective in operating in Iraq. 
The system of rewards created a series of incentives that led commanders to act 
similarly. OERs that say an officer had a good understanding of counterinsurgency 
tactics, techniques and procedures are not nearly as desirable as those that say an officer 
was responsible for the killing of a number of “insurgents” or “terrorists.” Similarly, 
officers were all afraid of losing their jobs for a plethora of reasons described in earlier 
chapters and therefore felt compelled to micromanage to protect their own careers. 
 64
Commanders’ decisions, therefore, are as much a response to the system of rewards and 
punishments setup in the Army as they are a product of organizational culture. 
 Leaders could be relatively autonomous in their decision-making but still believed 
that they had to produce outputs acceptable to their superiors. The first cases to be 
examined were the negative ones that showed leaders micromanaging or seek glory for 
themselves. These leaders were the type that left most of the interviewees scratching their 
heads when they were in Iraq in wonderment about what was actually going on in that 
particular leader’s head. There are many stories that helped to make this point clearer and 
the most prominent one follows. 
 One of the first interviewees had multiple battalion commanders. This was a 
common situation for many of the interviewees because their platoons or companies were 
often attached to different battalions. The most outlandish battalion commander was one 
that stood on top of a building calling everyone “pussies” and telling the insurgents to 
come out and fight. The ironic part was that they did come out and fight just not in the 
way that this battalion commander wanted them to.75 This was the contradiction of 
counterinsurgency that this leader did not grasp.   
 The question still remains though, as to whether or not these interviews shed any 
particular light on the decision-making process? Individuals could and did have 
tremendous amounts of control at their decision-making levels. However, these 
individuals were only part of a larger bureaucratic system and in many respects had 
similar behaviors, presumably based on training and the cultural environment. In 
addition, these individuals were constantly trying to meet the demands of their superiors 
as they perceived them. This suggests that Model I and Model II have the most sway over 
this process. In counter to that, there is still the need to take a look at the chess game 
example given by Alison and Zelikow when describing the various different models.76 
 The most prevalent factors that came through the interviews seemed to be one of 
overwhelming adherence to SOPs and ROEs. On top of this was a general attitude of 
                                                 
75 This was in an interview with CPT Michael Gretz and artillery officer who served as an infantry 
platoon leader with 1-25 Infantry who conducted operations in northwestern Iraq outside of Mosul during 
2005. He was describing another battalion commander in his brigade who was famous within the brigade 
for doing this. 
76 Alison and Zelikow, 6. 
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fear, a fear that many leaders experienced over in Iraq and in the Army in general. This 
was not one of the enemy but one of the hierarchies. There are numerous stories of 
commanders being unwilling to support troops if they stepped outside of these lines. One 
of these problems was if shots were fired. There were often incidences of where these 
soldiers were questioned to why they were firing their weapons as warning shots or even 
at an enemy who fired at them. 
 In Iraq there seemed to be in the majority of cases a fear of the hierarchy and what 
it would do. There were times when a Company Man in Iraq would jump up and down 
and scream at their men “that you will fire your weapons if you feel at all in danger, that 
is a direct order, I am a superior officer and it will be all my fault if something negative 
happens because of your actions.”77 This would help somewhat but most soldiers would 
still be more afraid of their hierarchy than anything a Company Man, especially a platoon 
leader, could do for or against them. 
 What was interesting about the ROE, is that they were not as restrictive as they 
were often interpreted to be. When it comes down to it, the ROE states that a soldier is 
only allowed to fire at a positively identified enemy or when they believed their life is in 
danger. That seems entirely reasonable based on the fact that the United States military is 
not at war with every single Iraqi in Iraq. However, the ways in which it was enforced 
left many people blaming the ROE itself instead of the people who enforced. In most 
battalions there were dialogues that occurred regarding the appropriateness of when, 
where and against whom it was okay to shoot weapons, however, soldiers still felt as if 
they were going to be court-martialed if they did so.  
 This fear went up the chain of command too. As many interviewees pointed out, 
their commanders would not even float ideas that were initiated from the bottom. Ideas 
were often stopped before they got started in a sense. The commanders would often act as 
just “no” men without even giving any consideration to the idea and handing it up to the 
higher to be decided upon. There was also no room for alterations at the lowest command  
                                                 
77 Personal experience as an armor platoon leader in 1-13 Armor Battalion operating around Taji, Iraq 
in 2005. 
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level possible. Commanders were not left to do their own risk matrices to determine the 
risk of certain courses of action. They were just left to implement the missions dictated to 
them from above. Commanders then could only live in fear that they might violate the 
micromanagement coming from above. 
 The idea of offensive high-intensity conflict has not left the cultural mindset of 
the U.S. military in Iraq. Whether there are those who are complaining about the gung ho 
attitude or those that are touting its effectiveness and claiming to this day “that we need 
to take the fight to the enemy” this mindset still pervades everything that is done in Iraq. 
There is a large amount of consideration given to high-intensity operations as part of a 
mid-intensity conflict but almost no training given to young Company Men on how to 
conduct basic policing and investigative procedures. However, there are some that 
innovate and realize that if they create relationships with the local populations they might 
receive help in dealing with the insurgents. For example they apologize for waking the 
Iraqis up at 3:00 AM in the morning for some poorly planned raid so that they will not be 
blamed for the hardships faced and in fact be protected by popular sentiment when the 
insurgents do plan their attacks. Without the training in counterinsurgency tactics the 
junior leader can find it hard to innovate. This results in the reinforcement of kinetic 
operations and tactics because they are what the leaders know and the system reinforces. 
 Organizational culture is doing much for the detriment of the U.S. military in Iraq. 
Leaders high up are not doing enough to ensure that those on the ground are supported 
and have the ability and the right to take the initiative when they believe it is necessary 
given their experience with the local population. Sometimes leaders encourage audacity 
but it is the wrong kind for this situation. An environment for risk taking needs to be 
created that allows lower level leaders to take initiative but also requires them to think in 
order to mitigate catastrophic risks, like the loss of U.S. soldiers or Iraqi citizens. Only 
when this environment of empowering the lower level leadership in such a way that is 
conducive to a low intensity environment can the situation become better. However, all 
situations will evolve and therefore leaders will have to monitor the information that is 
being sent to them and make sure the requested assets are on the ground for those 
requesting them.  
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C.  CONCLUSION 
 Unless the incentive structure for the military undergoes some relatively drastic 
change, the Army as an organization will continue to see many of the problems that it 
faced in Iraq in future counterinsurgency environments. By the end of 2007 the situation 
in Iraq seems to have taken a turn for the better. This is in large part due to the arrival of 
General Petraeus and the surge of troops in Iraq. Other influential events, such as the fact 
that Sunni Tribes in the Al Anbar province are now working directly with the United 
States Army, also have had a positive impact.  
 There was a wealth of information that was constantly being produced by the 
lower levels. In conducting the interviews it was plain to see that many of the Company 
Men had quickly abandoned any notion of glorious high intensity battlefield and had 
instead begun to focus on what worked. As this feedback went higher up the chain of 
command, there was more of a focus on high intensity operations. This wealth of 
information never really worked its way from the bottom up to become an integrated part 
of the strategy or tactics. The real change came from the top when Petraeus pointed out 
that within his own division during OIF I he had to force the battalion commanders to 
change their ways.78 These self unaware officers essentially block any change coming up 
from the bottom because they are trying to preserve the system, even if it means losing a 
war.   
 
                                                 
78 Lt. General David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq, 
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